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CONSUMER LAW’S EQUITY GAP
Vijay Raghavan*
Abstract
This Article is about the views that shape and constrain the
development of consumer law. Consider the market for short-term, highcost loans. Policymakers tend to justify intervening in these markets on
inefficiency grounds (consumers exhibit present bias) and rarely on
equitable grounds (these loans cost too much). Why? One recent
explanation suggests that policymakers may focus on inefficiency because
they believe access to credit is essential for social and economic
development. In this Article, I offer an alternative explanation. The lack of
equity in consumer law is not just a function of narrow conceptions
internal to consumer law but the external view that the law should
prioritize efficiency and ignore equity. The dominant rationale for this
view is that redistribution through legal rules distorts economic behavior
more than redistribution through an income tax. Here, I discuss the
longstanding and recent critiques of this rationale and build on those
critiques to show why it is a fundamental mistake to ignore distribution in
consumer law. In particular, background legal rules shape consumer
demand in individual markets. These background conditions may mean
that seemingly irrational exchanges are, in fact, rational. An approach
tethered to consumer preferences may struggle to justify altering the terms
of rational exchanges. To overcome this problem, I suggest that we center
distribution in the way we justify interventions and conceptualize solutions
to problems in consumer financial markets. I detail what centering
distribution in consumer law might look like and conclude by considering
some objections to redistributive policies in consumer law.
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INTRODUCTION
In the runup to the 2020 Presidential election, a once-obscure and controversial
idea—that the President can and should unilaterally cancel student debt—briefly
went mainstream.1 Endorsed by a diverse cast of liberal politicians from Elizabeth
Warren2 to Bernie Sanders3 to Chuck Schumer,4 there appeared to be broad
Democratic support for swift executive action. But the support for student debt relief
engendered an equally strong backlash from notable liberal economists. As an
example, here is Jason Furman, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under
President Obama, on the wisdom of pursuing student debt relief: “Student loan debt
forgiveness likely has a multiplier close to zero. Forgiveness is taxable. If this
negative cash flow effect outweighs interest savings would even be net negative.
And wealth effect small in short run. Arbitrary/regressive $1T for ~$0 GDP, not a
great idea.”5
On the surface, these critiques are about the purported regressivity of massive
student loan debt relief.6 But lurking beneath the surface of these critiques is a deeper
and more foundational objection to using the law to redistribute income.7 This
1
See Astra Taylor, How the Biden Administration Can Free Americans from Student
Debt, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/how-thebiden-administration-can-free-americans-from-student-debt
[https://perma.cc/2DQP7WW7]; Luke Herrine, The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 BUFF.
L. REV. 281 (2020).
2
Elizabeth Warren (@ewarren), TWITTER (Oct. 16, 2020, 9:23 AM),
https://twitter.com/ewarren/status/1317123919069982720 [https://perma.cc/S5PF-U5EE].
3
Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2020, 10:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/SenSanders/status/1299021647392002049
[https://perma.cc/GT2S7N8T].
4
Chuck Schumer (@ChuckSchumer), TWITTER (Oct. 16, 2020, 9:40 AM),
https://twitter.com/chuckschumer/status/1317128255279857664?lang=en [https://perma.cc/
2Q2N- H76S].
5
Jason Furman (@JasonFurman), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2020, 9:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/jasonfurman/status/1328193936364539909?lang=en [https://perma.cc/
HLU2-993Q]; see also Aarthi Swaminathan, Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers Is
‘Skeptical’ About Student Loan Forgiveness, YAHOO! FIN. (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/student-loan-forgiveness-larry-summers-skeptical-173401
447.html [https://perma.cc/KR36-PSM5] (explaining that the former Treasury Secretary is
also skeptical about the proposed student debt forgiveness).
6
But see Charlie Eaton, Adam Goldstein, Laura Hamilton & Frederick Wherry, Student
Debt Cancellation IS Progressive: Correcting Empirical and Conceptual Errors,
ROOSEVELT INST. (June 8, 2021), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/student-debtcancellation-is-progressive/ [https://perma.cc/GW8W-4LRE] (challenging the view that
student debt cancellation is regressive).
7
And recent news suggests this backlash has temporarily succeeded in preserving the
status quo. See Pia Peterson, Student Loan Relief Has Changed the Lives of Millions of
Americans. It Ends in September, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 25, 2021, 12:59 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/piapeterson/student-loan-relief-savings-forbearance
[https://perma.cc/J949-E42Q].
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Article is about that foundational objection, its recent history, and its vitality as a
constraint on redistributive policies in consumer law.8
Interventions in consumer financial markets are typically justified on narrow,
technical grounds.9 Policymakers primarily view consumer law as a tool to correct
market imperfections caused by cognitive bias or imperfect information.10
Distribution is rarely an explicit goal of consumer law, and consumer law does not
use a broad set of distributional levers to attack inequality in consumer financial
markets.11
8

A brief note on terminology. This Article is primarily about interventions in consumer
financial markets but uses the term consumer law as opposed to consumer financial law or
consumer financial protection law. Much like the term private law, consumer law is a broad
term that “eludes precise definition.” John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and
Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012). I use the term here for both its
simplicity, and because this Article is a dialogue with recent articles that use the same term.
See Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution,
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019); Andrew T. Hayashi, Myopic Consumer Law, 106 VA.
L. REV. 689 (2020).
9
See discussion infra Section II.B.3; Van Loo, supra note 8, at 220 (“Many existing
consumer protection laws, and many calls for new regulation by legal scholars, aim to lessen
information asymmetries and behavioral biases, in part because . . . foundational economic
theory holds that markets function best, and society benefits most, when consumers are
informed and rational.”).
10
See id.
11
See Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, The Analysis of Benefits in Consumer
Protection Regulations, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 197, 256–65 (2019) (citing information
failures and cognitive biases as common rationales for consumer protection regulation). Even
where legal scholarship argues for intervention on distributional grounds, the basis for
unequal distribution is tied to market failure. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64, 98–100 (2008) (explaining that disparate impact due
to differences in information and rationality may warrant intervention in consumer financial
markets). I must make a few important qualifications to the broader argument of this Article.
Equitable considerations are certainly relevant in the design of federal housing policy and
education policy, which both intersect with consumer law. Moreover, equity is a central
concern of consumer bankruptcy, which has an important function as social insurance. See
Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 1 (2005) (“Bankruptcy scholars generally agree that consumer
bankruptcy functions, at least in part, as a form of social insurance.”). In arguing that equity
plays little to no role in the structure and design of consumer financial regulation, I do not
mean to suggest that there is no equity in consumer law broadly defined. My argument is
instead centered on the federal regulation of consumer markets by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The
CFPB and the FTC play a central role in regulating consumer financial markets. As noted
above, concerns about the distribution of resources in consumer financial markets have been
a longstanding theme of consumer scholarship. Indeed, these concerns appeared to undergird
the push to fundamentally reshape the regulatory landscape in 2010. Yet, in formal
policymaking, equity is either an afterthought or understood as best addressed outside
consumer law.
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This narrow focus on market failure stands in stark contrast to the broader
concerns about inequity in consumer financial markets voiced by many scholars. A
longstanding theme in popular works on consumer finance is the extreme financial
cost of poverty. From David Caplovitz’s classic sociological study The Poor Pay
More to Mehrsa Baradaran’s recent How the Other Half Banks, scholars have
documented the chronic and widening gaps between the rich and the poor in the
financial marketplace.12 These works show that access to our financial system is
unequally distributed in our society, and this unequal distribution has significant
costs.13 The prescriptions across these and other works vary,14 but they suggest that
consumer law can play a role in combating inequality.
What accounts for the gap between the broader distributional concerns in
popular scholarship and consumer law’s narrow prescriptions? One recent
explanation is there is no gap.15 Policymakers are sensitive to distributional issues
12

See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOWINCOME FAMILIES (1967); JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR (1994); GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO
POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS (2010); MICHAEL S.
BARR, NO SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2012) [hereinafter
BARR, NO SLACK]; MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015).
13
As an example, consider unbanked consumers (consumers who do not have a bank
account) and underbanked consumers (consumers who have access to at least one bank
account but use fringe financial services). A recent poll suggests that the percentage of
unbanked consumers has doubled since the pandemic and the number of underbanked
consumers has increased to close to 25% since 2017. See Charlotte Principato, How the
Roughly One-Quarter of Underbanked U.S. Adults Differ from Fully Banked Individuals,
MORNING CONSULT (Aug. 17, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://morningconsult.com/2021/08/17/
unbanked-underbanked-demographic-profile/ [https://perma.cc/52N7-5XLM]. For prepandemic figures, see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., How America Banks: Household Use of
Banking and Financial Services (2020) (2019 unbanked figures); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (2020) (2017
underbanked figures). Consumers who lack access to conventional banking services turn to
costly fringe financial services. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REGUL.
121, 123–24 (2004) [hereinafter Barr, Banking]. This has impacted both the distribution of
federal aid and the efficacy of it. Cf. Paul Kiel & Jeff Ernsthausen, Debt Collectors Have
Made a Fortune This Year. Now They’re Coming for More, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collectors-have-made-a-fortune-this-year-now-they
re-coming-for-more [https://perma.cc/P5LR-D3WR]; David Dayen, Your Coronavirus
Check Is Coming. Your Bank Can Grab It, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://prospect.org/coronavirus/banks-can-grab-stimulus-check-pay-debts/ [https://perma.
cc/A2SV-8KBX].
14
See BARR, NO SLACK, supra note 12, at 152–53 (proposing a combination of
improved disclosures, transparency, and “behaviorally informed techniques”); see also
Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2014)
(proposing publicly administered deposits through the Post Office).
15
See Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093,
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but believe any bad consequences that flow from the unequal distribution of
resources in consumer financial markets are the product of market failure. This belief
stems from a deep faith in credit as an important social and economic lever and the
capacity of properly functioning markets to deliver affordable and safe products.16
But the recent debate over student debt cancellation suggests that this account
is incomplete. When policymakers move away from market failure and towards
distribution, they are met with stiff opposition. This opposition suggests that the lack
of distribution in consumer law is not solely a function of narrow conceptions
internal to consumer law but also external constraints. And here, I argue that one of
the primary external constraints on the development of consumer law is the widely
held view that law should prioritize efficiency over equity and leave redistribution
to the tax system.17
This view, which is better known as the “double-distortion” argument, is
commonly attributed to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.18 Drawing on
foundational principles from optimal tax theory, Kaplow and Shavell argued that
redistributing wealth through a legal rule distorts behavior more than the same
redistribution through an income tax.19 As such, legal rules should be designed to
maximize efficiency, and the distributional costs of efficient legal rules, to the extent
they matter, should be handled through the tax system.20 Kaplow and Shavell
initially advanced the double-distortion argument to discourage equity-based
allocations of entitlements in private law.21 But the double-distortion argument has
1097–99 (2019) [hereinafter Atkinson, Rethinking] (arguing that consumer scholars and
advocates view credit “as a viable mechanism of smoothing consumption or as a catalyst for
social mobility” but ignore economic realities that undermine the effectiveness of credit as
social provision). To be sure, Atkinson’s critique is not about the narrowness of
policymaking in consumer law. Instead, it is a broader normative critique of credit policy
and credit regulation as anti-poverty measures.
16
See id.
17
To be clear, I am not arguing that this view is a hard constraint on distribution in
consumer law. Instead, I am arguing that it is an implicit background assumption that shapes
the way policymakers justify and design regulatory interventions in consumer financial
markets.
18
David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A
Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 n.14
(2014) (“The phrase ‘double-distortion argument’ is primarily used in the existing literature
to refer to Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s analysis of distribution through legal rules.”);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994).
19
See Gamage, supra note 18, at 73 (explaining the connection between Kaplow and
Shavell’s double-distortion argument and the Atkinson-Stiglitz model for analyzing optimalchoice-of-tax-instruments questions); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency v. Distributional
Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income
Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981).
20
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18.
21
Id. at 669 (comparing income-insensitive and income-sensitive strict liability rules
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since been extended to regulation22 and is the background principle behind the
prevailing view that regulators should focus exclusively on cost-benefit analysis and
ignore distributional issues.23
If the double-distortion argument is correct, then it is sensible to use market
failure as a framework to justify regulatory interventions. But recent critiques make
clear that strict adherence to the double-distortion argument is increasingly
unjustified. Within the tax literature, scholars have challenged the assumptions
underlying the double-distortion argument and shown that redistribution through a
legal rule may be less distortionary and preferable to redistribution through an
income tax.24 Outside the tax literature, scholars have argued that the doubledistortion argument ignores the political impediments to redistribution through the
tax system.25 Perhaps the deepest challenge to the orthodoxy comes from Zachary
Liscow’s work on efficiency. Liscow’s work shows that efficient legal rules are
generally biased towards the rich,26 and this effect may compound over time.27
Liscow’s work highlights the costs of pursuing efficiency without any wealth
redistribution.28 Taken together, these critiques make clear that the double-distortion
argument does not always hold, and the failure to take distribution seriously in
designing legal rules may have played a role in growing income inequality.

for accidents); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design
Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2487 (2014)
[hereinafter Liscow, Reducing Inequality] (discussing the choice of the appropriate legal rule
as an entitlement transfer).
22
See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1506–
10 (2018) (tracing the extension of the double-distortion argument from common law rules
to regulatory policy in the work of Kaplow & Shavell and others).
23
See id. at 1490 (“The dominant academic view with respect to regulatory policy holds
that individual regulations should not concern themselves with questions of distribution.
Instead, rules should be designed to maximize net benefits—their benefits minus their
costs.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 42 (2018) (“It is important to
see that in general, the best response to unjustified inequality is a redistributive income tax,
not regulation—which is a crude and potentially counterproductive redistributive tool.”); see
also Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1688 (2018)
[hereinafter Liscow, Efficiency] (“Arguably the most prominent use of efficiency analysis by
government actors is that by federal government administrative agencies . . . .”).
24
See discussion infra Section II.B.
25
See discussion infra Section II.C.
26
Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23, at 1651.
27
Zachary Liscow & Daniel Giraldo Paez, Inequality Snowballing 1 (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327460)
[https://perma.cc/AGZ3B4GL].
28
See generally Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23. Liscow’s basic insight, as described
in more detail in Sections I.D and II.A infra, is that the declining marginal utility of income
means policy analysis tied to preference aggregation will generally be biased towards the
rich, and this bias can increase over time.
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In this Article, I build on this scholarship to show why it is a fundamental
mistake to ignore distribution in consumer law.29 Background legal conditions may
create demand for expensive private credit. For example, a welfare state contraction
may trigger increased demand for short-term, high-cost loans. Policymakers may
seek to intervene in these markets to cure market imperfections, but they will likely
run into two objections. The first is that the intervention is inefficient because
consumers willingly enter into these transactions aware of the costs and risks.30 The
second is that the intervention is regressive because there will be no redistribution
to offset the costs of reducing the supply of expensive private credit. These critiques
grow stronger as the welfare state contracts and the cost of credit increases. In this
Article, I detail how these critiques shape and constrain the development of
consumer law using recent regulatory interventions as examples.31
To break free from these constraints, I argue that policymakers must rethink
how they justify interventions in consumer financial markets and expand the set of
tools they use to address market abuse. Policymakers should consider centering
distribution in the way we justify interventions and conceptualize solutions to
problems in consumer financial markets. This means examining consumer financial
markets to see if cost and access are unequally distributed and intervening in these
markets to address unequal distribution (as opposed to merely correcting market
inefficiency). In addition, policymakers should consider tools that address the
demand for credit and not just the supply of credit. Building on the emerging
literature on infrastructure regulation,32 I sketch out three such tools: rate and term
restrictions, mandates, and transfers. Rate and term restrictions are common in

29
In this sense, my Article is different than recent scholarship on consumer law as a
site for redistribution. See Van Loo, supra note 8, at 213–14; John Linarelli, Debt in Just
Societies: A General Framework for Regulating Credit, 14 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 409
(2020) [hereinafter Linarelli, Debt]; John Linarelli, Equality and Access to Credit: A Social
Contract Framework, 84 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2021); see also Ramsi A. Woodcock,
Personalizing Prices to Redistribute Wealth in Antitrust and Utility Rate Regulation, WIS.
L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378864 [https://perma.cc/AND3-PPX7]
(last visited Sept. 19, 2021). Although I broadly agree with these scholars, my goal is not to
convince policymakers and scholars that consumer law is a viable site for redistribution.
Instead, my goal is to convince policymakers and scholars that consumer law cannot
effectively discipline markets if it ignores distribution.
30
And, as discussed in Part II infra, even if consumers are present-biased, interventions
may still be suboptimal under an efficiency framework.
31
The interventions I explore here concern fringe financial products. But these critiques
extend beyond the regulation of fringe finance. For example, you will find similar critiques
of attempts to regulate for-profit schools. See Anthony J. Guida Jr. & David Figuli, Higher
Education’s Gainful Employment and 90/10 Rules: Unintended “Scarlet Letters” for
Minority, Low-Income, and Other At-Risk Students, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 132 (2012).
32
See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure,
and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018); Alan M.
White, Banks as Utilities, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1241 (2016); Morgan Ricks, Money as
Infrastructure, 2018 COL. BUS. L. REV. 757 (2018).
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consumer law, but mandates and transfers are not.33 These three are best understood
as mutually reinforcing tools that can help consumer law leverage cross-subsidies in
consumer financial markets to redistribute resources. The techniques explored here
are common regulatory approaches used outside consumer financial markets.34 And
it is time that consumer law formally embrace a broader policy toolkit.
There are several objections one could raise to more distribution in consumer
law. One I focus on here is path dependency.35 In her history of twentieth-century
American political economy, Monica Prasad suggests that the development of
America’s complex public-private financial system may have undermined the
development of a European-style welfare state in America.36 For Prasad, there is a
tradeoff between what she terms “mortgage Keynesianism”—social provision
through the financial system—and direct social provision through tax-and-transfer.37
Building on Prasad’s work, Abbye Atkinson makes a compelling normative case
against credit as a social provision.38 Credit is an intertemporal transfer (cash or inkind) between two or more time periods. Per Atkinson, credit can only work as a
social provision if a consumer becomes independently wealthier or receives
additional public support in the gap between when the consumer receives the transfer
33
Most states cap interest rates on consumer loans and restrict the terms of these loans.
See STATE RATE CAPS FOR $500 AND $2000 LOANS, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (2021),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/FS_State_Rate_Cap
s_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ43-EVGZ]; Heather Morton, Payday Lending State Statutes,
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/financ
ial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZF6BZR6Q]. Outside the Military Lending Act federal caps on interest rates are less common. See
10 U.S.C. § 987 (2019) (establishing an interest rate cap of 36% on most consumer loans to
service members to protect from predatory lending practices). Additionally, federal law sets
restrictions on the terms of various consumer loans. See 26 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2014)
(mortgage loans); 26 C.F.R. § 1026.51 (2013) (credit cards). Some federal banking laws,
such as the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2019), and the Community
Development Financial Institutions Act, Id. § 4701, include soft and somewhat amorphous
mandates. I distinguish these mandates from the ones I am proposing infra Section III.B.
34
See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross Subsidies: Government’s
Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2018) (discussing some of the advantages
that government created cross-subsidies have over taxes).
35
Path dependency, as I use it here, is broadly consistent with Jacob Hacker’s classic
description of the term in the context of welfare design. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED
WELFARE STATE 9 (2002) (“Small initial differences in circumstances [between public and
privately administered social provision] may have large eventual effects as self-reinforcing
processes encourage continued reliance on established institutions of [privately
administered] social provision.”).
36
See MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE
PARADOX OF POVERTY 250 (2012) (postulating that “a set of progressive interventions taken
[by the United States] during the early twentieth century produced decidedly non-progressive
results”).
37
Id. at 221, 227.
38
Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 15.

2022]

CONSUMER LAW’S EQUITY GAP

519

and must repay the transfer.39 More recently, Anne Fleming’s history of “the private
law of the poor” shows that the early development of consumer credit regulation
during the Lochner era was often explicitly in tension with the expansion of the
welfare state.40
Taken together, this scholarship should give any person who favors more
redistribution in consumer financial markets serious pause. Redistribution of
resources in consumer financial markets is unequivocally not a solution to poverty.41
If redistributive policies in consumer law are used as a wedge to fracture current
support for massive expansions of the welfare state, then perhaps the project should
be abandoned. But in my view, the path dependency argument proves too much.42
It is difficult to draw clear lessons from the complex web of political, social,
and economic factors that resulted in the development of the modern American
financial system. For example, Prasad’s work suggests that development of the
progressive income tax was a key component in underwriting American mortgage
Keynesianism.43 Yet few proponents of a robust social safety net would conclude
that we should scrap the progressive structure of the income tax because of this fact.
Moreover, whether credit can function as social provision turns less on the
mechanics of credit as an abstract notion and more on the concrete set of legal
obligations tied to the credit relationship.44

39

Id. at 1098–99.
Anne Fleming, The Public Interest in the Private Law of the Poor, 14 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 159, 175–79 (2019) (tracing the history of anti-pauperist arguments in favor of
credit restrictions).
41
As Abbye Atkinson explains, “the problem of entrenched and enduring poverty that
leaves people consistently unable to afford basic necessities cannot be addressed by a device
that requires future prosperity and economic growth.” See Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note
15, at 1093.
42
In Part IV infra, I consider a narrower variant of the path dependency argument: that
redistributive policies in consumer law might crowd out efforts to radically reshape our
financial system.
43
See PRASAD, supra note 36, at 253–54. Prasad’s historical account, which is
summarized in more detail infra Part IV, suggests that America failed to develop a robust
welfare state because of populist interventions in the early twentieth that sought to break up
concentrations of wealth and redistribute resources to agrarians. Per Prasad, these
interventions created a consumption-based political economy that was hostile to the kind of
flat or regressive taxes common in European welfare states.
44
For example, in recent scholarship, Atkinson suggests that at least part of the problem
with credit as social provision is the distinct way federal law treats credit and debt. Abbye
Atkinson, Borrowing Equality, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1406–07 (2020) [hereinafter
Atkinson, Borrowing]. Federal policy simultaneously encourages access to credit but
discourages defaulting or discharging debt. Id. at 1407–09. Per Atkinson, this “acoustic
separation” ensures that debt functions as a tool of subordination, which undermines the
effectiveness of credit as social provision. Id. at 1410. In order to address the problem,
Atkinson suggests a uniform approach to credit and debt and more permissive rules around
debt discharge might help. Id. at 1412.
40

520

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

In other words, I still think there is a strong case for distributionally-oriented
consumer law as a complement to expansions of the safety net. There will inevitably
be gaps in the potential expansions of our social safety net and public infrastructure,
which the private market will exploit.45 Armed with adequate tools, consumer law
can play an important role in curbing some of this abuse.46 Our recent history shows
that efforts to narrowly channel our distributive energy have been rewarded with
rising inequality and a shrinking welfare state. The problem of inequality is large
and complex. A plural approach to distributional equity may make more sense than
the singular approaches of the past.47
***
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the
debate surrounding the double-distortion argument. Although the double-distortion
argument has been the subject of fierce debate within tax scholarship, the
implications of this debate have not been internalized outside tax scholarship. As a
result, it is common for scholars writing outside tax or for non-tax audiences to
dismiss attempts to use regulation to redistribute income without engaging with the
broader critiques of the double-distortion argument.48 Part II builds on the critiques
of the double-distortion argument to show how the argument can stifle the
development of law in certain areas. In particular, where the welfare gains from
regulatory interventions are small and difficult to measure, and where the underlying
market fills in gaps in the social safety net, the double-distortion argument provides
critics with a handy framework to oppose interventions as both inefficient and
regressive. In Part III, I offer thoughts on what distributionally-oriented consumer
law might look like. I consider three policy levers: rate and term restrictions,
mandates, and transfers. I briefly sketch how we might use these tools to leverage
cross-subsidies in consumer financial markets. I take up the problem of path
45

We can imagine several kinds of gaps: gaps in substance, gaps in process, and gaps
in scope. As a substantive matter, safety net expansions may not reach all Americans,
pushing some Americans towards high-cost credit. See, e.g., Fleischer & Hemel, The
Architecture of a Basic Income, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 688–89 (2020) (discussing the
likelihood that predatory lending will persist when citizens receive UBI). As a procedural
matter, there may be gaps in the benefit distribution, which is filled by costly, private
intermediaries. See Dayen, supra note 13 (discussing problems with our current distribution
of benefits). Finally, safety net expansions may not address sources of inequality in our
present system, such as outstanding debt. See Kiel & Ernsthausen, supra note 13 (detailing
increased debt collection during the pandemic as a result of stimulus payments).
46
For a discussion of how consumer law can address these problems, see infra Part III.
47
Zachary Liscow, Redistribution for Realists, 107 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2022) (calling
this a “thousand points of equity” approach).
48
See Fleming, supra note 40, at 195–96 (“[T]he past four decades of law and
economics scholarship has shown a fundamental flaw in the argument for redistribution
through private law.”); Hayashi, supra 8, at 752 (“Although we might consider regulating
the terms of trade in order to affect redistribution between the buyer and the seller, there are
compelling arguments that redistribution is best handled through the tax system.”).
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dependency in Part IV and conclude by considering the institutional implications of
more distribution in consumer law.
I. THE DOUBLE-DISTORTION ARGUMENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS
A. The “New” Efficiency Rationale
Should legal rules be used to redistribute resources in society? The prevailing
answer to this question in legal scholarship is no: legal rules should focus exclusively
on efficiency and ignore distributional equity.49
The early literature on the economic analysis of the law provided several
rationales for why the law should prioritize efficiency over equity.50 These classic
efficiency rationales included the view that equity was irrelevant or, to the extent
equity mattered, corrective transfers through a broad-based tax were better than
redistribution through legal rules.51 The theory was that a broad-based tax can
achieve more redistribution than a narrowly tailored legal rule and is less susceptible
to manipulation.52
Classic efficiency rationales, however, did not resolve the efficiency-versusequity debate. In 1994, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell proposed a “new
efficiency rationale,” which seemed to permanently tilt the scales towards

49

See Revesz, supra note 22, at 1501 (noting that Kaplow & Shavell’s argument against
non-tax redistribution is extremely influential and widely embraced).
50
Prioritizing efficiency over equity can be traced back to Progressive Era debates over
rate regulation. Realists, such as Robert Hale, who were attempting to apply Fabian rent
theory to rate regulation confronted two problems: 1) setting rates at levels that would
incentivize production but discourage extraction; and 2) ensuring that marginal borrowers
were not priced out of markets. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON
LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 201–03
(1998). Channeling all redistribution through the tax system was offered as a solution to “the
problem of ensuring that producers earn enough to cover the costs of production in industries
in which fixed costs are large but marginal costs are small.” Woodcock, supra note 29, at 18
(crediting this view to Herbert Hotelling). For a discussion on why a pivot back towards rate
regulation in consumer law may avoid these problems, see discussion infra Section III.A.
51
See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2001) (“Justifying this exclusive focus on efficiency has
always required adopting at least one of two beliefs: that the distribution of economic wellbeing has no part in what defines the just society, or that the state possess the knowledge and
ability to effect the sort of perfectly corrective transfers that could costlessly and precisely
undo any undesired distributional effects of a legal rule.”); Ronen Avraham, David Fortus &
Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A
Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (2004) (“One of the
arguments traditionally offered to support this view is that redistribution through the legal
system is by nature more haphazard (in the sense of less comprehensive and less precise)
than redistribution through the tax system.”).
52
See Sanchirico, supra note 51, at 1006.
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efficiency.53 Drawing on foundational principles from optimal tax theory, Kaplow
and Shavell argued that the question of whether we should pursue redistribution
through legal rules could be reduced to a determination of which of two tax
instruments—legal rules or an income tax—is less distortionary.54
A central question in optimal tax theory is which tax instruments maximize
revenue while minimizing economic distortions.55 In a perfect world, the state could
tax individuals based on their different endowments and tastes in order to achieve
vertical and horizontal equity.56 In practice, however, individuals’ endowments and
tastes are not directly observable, and the state must rely on indirect proxies such as
income or consumption.57 Relying on indirect proxies is problematic because
individuals have some control over these proxy measures.58 Individuals can reduce
their tax liability by changing their behavior (working less or consuming
differently).
An early framework for optimal taxation was proposed by Frank Ramsey.59 To
minimize economic distortions, the Ramsey model sets “tax rates on different
commodities inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand for a good.”60 Tax
rates should be set higher where demand is inelastic and lower where demand is
elastic.61 By tying rates to elasticity, the Ramsey model is arguably regressive:
suggesting “tax rates ought to be highest on the necessities of life like food and
shelter, and lowest on discretionary luxury purchases like yachts.”62 Moreover, the
Ramsey model assumed that different taxes distort behavior in the same way.63
A more recent framework comes from Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz.
The Atkinson and Stiglitz framework suggests that under certain conditions, an
income tax may distort behavior differently than an excise tax.64 The basic argument
is that individuals can reduce their tax liability under both an income tax and an
excise tax by exchanging taxable labor for untaxable leisure.65 Thus, both a labor tax
53

See id. at 1005–07; Avraham et al., supra note 51, at 1127.
See Gamage, supra note 18, at 73.
55
See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 56 (1976); but see Gamage, supra note 18, at 16–17
(noting that distributional equity also matters for optimal tax theory: “[a] government could
minimize distortionary costs by levying only lump sum taxes . . . . The reason governments
do not typically levy lump-sum taxes is distributional equity”).
56
See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 55, at 56.
57
See id. (“It is the difficulties associated with observing characteristics which make
the theory of taxation an interesting and difficult problem.”).
58
See Gamage, supra note 18, at 16.
59
See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
60
See FRIED, supra note 50, at 203.
61
Id. (“[T]he less price-sensitive one’s desire is for a given good, the less likely one is
to be deterred from purchasing it if the price is raised by a tax.”).
62
Id. at 204.
63
See id.
64
See Gamage, supra note 18, at 23.
65
See id. (“[T]he Atkinson-Stiglitz model introduces a form of consumption—called
‘leisure’—that is assumed to be exempt from taxation under all possible tax instruments.”).
54
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and an excise tax reduce work incentives and result in a “labor-to-leisure”
distortion.66 Individuals can also avoid an excise tax by “shift[ing] from purchasing
higher-taxed consumer goods to purchasing lower-taxed consumer goods.”67 Thus,
an excise tax imposes an additional distortion on consumption. This extra distortion
or “double distortion” implies that an income tax, which distorts behavior in one
dimension, may be preferable to an excise tax, which distorts behavior in two
dimensions.68
In their now-famous paper, “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than an
Income Tax in Redistributing Income,” Kaplow and Shavell extended the Atkinson
and Stiglitz framework to legal rules.69 Viewing legal rules as tax instruments,
Kaplow and Shavell argued that redistribution through legal rules distorts labor
incentives in the same manner as redistribution through an income tax.70 But legal
rules, like excise taxes, carry an added distortion: changing behavior subject to the
legal rule.71 As such, an efficient legal rule and more redistribution through an
income tax are preferable to an inefficient legal rule and less redistribution through
an income tax.
Kaplow and Shavell illustrated the basic intuition behind their argument with a
simple example. Suppose the government is trying to raise an additional 1% of
revenue from the rich to redistribute to the poor.72 The government has two choices:
increase marginal rates for the rich by 1% or modify legal rules to raise an additional
1% of revenue from the rich.73 For example, the additional revenue could be raised
by modifying the efficient strict liability rule for accidents, where individuals pay
for the harm they caused, to an inefficient legal rule, where the rich pay more and
the poor pay less.74 As Kaplow and Shavell explained, both the inefficient legal rule
and the increased income tax result in the same labor-to-leisure distortion because
each is tied to income.75 One can avoid a higher marginal rate or higher damages by
trading labor for leisure.76 But the inefficient legal rule, like an excise tax, has the
added cost of reducing the amount of care below the amount under an efficient
regime.77

66

See id.
Id.
68
See id. at 24.
69
See id. at 73 (explaining that Kaplow and Shavell’s support for their argument “is an
extension of the [Atkinson & Stiglitz] double-distortion argument against the use of luxury
excise taxes”).
70
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18, at 668.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 669.
75
Id. at 668.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 680.
67
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Kaplow and Shavell’s work was initially concerned with inefficient and
equitable allocations in private law.78 But the double-distortion argument has since
been extended to regulatory design. And today, it provides the intellectual
foundation for the dominant view that regulatory design should focus exclusively on
cost-benefit analysis and ignore distribution.79 Indeed, Cass Sunstein, the leading
evangelist of cost-benefit analysis in the legal academy, relies on Kaplow and
Shavell’s framework to generally argue against using regulation to address
distributional concerns.80 Sunstein’s support highlights an important point that is
worth emphasizing about the double-distortion argument. The double-distortion
argument is not an argument against redistribution but rather an argument in favor
of the least distortionary means to redistribute income. Kaplow and Shavell’s
framework is perfectly compatible with extensive redistribution but requires we use
the tax system to redistribute income.81
B. Internal Critiques
The double-distortion argument has long been controversial and subject to
debate among tax scholars. Internal critiques of the argument generally fall into two
categories. First, scholars challenge the assumptions about taxpayer homogeneity
and nonseparable preferences that undergird Kaplow and Shavell’s framework.
Second, even if the assumptions underlying the double-distortion argument are
correct, scholars suggest redistribution through a legal rule may be less distortionary
and preferable to redistribution through an income tax. David Gamage recently
added a third and more foundational critique of the empirical assumptions
underlying Kaplow and Shavell’s framework.
This section summarizes these internal critiques. At the outset, it is important
to note that few scholars suggest we abandon Kaplow and Shavell’s framework or
conduct most of our redistribution through the legal system. Instead, these internal
critiques make clear that the strongest conclusion of the double-distortion
argument—we should never redistribute income through legal rules—is unjustified.

78
Kaplow and Shavell offer the example of a tort rule that tied damages to the
tortfeasor’s income. Id. at 669.
79
See Revesz, supra note 22, at 1490.
80
SUNSTEIN, supra note 23, at 42.
81
See David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 439, 446–51 (2003).
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1. Assumptions and Exceptions
The double-distortion argument rests on two, somewhat-unrealistic
assumptions: 1) “taxpayers are homogeneous except in their ability to earn labor
income”; and 2) “taxpayer preferences are weakly separable between labor and
income.”82 As David Gamage explains, the first “implies that the ability to earn labor
income is the only characteristic of taxpayers relevant for distribution.”83 And the
second “implies that, for a given level of after-income-tax income, individuals will
allocate their disposable income among commodities in the same manner regardless
of the level of labor effort required to generate that level of income.”84
Relaxing these assumptions and recognizing heterogeneity with respect to
ability and consumption shows that Kaplow and Shavell’s framework may not
always hold. Legal rules may be able to “tag” attributes that are associated with
ability but difficult to capture with an income tax.85 For example, redistributing
income through tort may capture the harm of pollution in a way an income tax does
not. As Zachary Liscow explains, the tax code will treat “an individual who develops
asthma as a result of pollution, causing her income to drop from H to L” like all
other individuals earning income L.86 But “[r]edistributing more through the tort
‘tags’ the asthma-sufferer and compensates for the failure of the tax code to use all
available information relevant to redistribution.”87 Similarly, Ronen Avraham,
David Fortas, and Kyle Logue argue that taxpayers may be heterogeneous with
respect to their ability to take care, even fixing income.88 In such a case, different
care capacities of tortfeasors may change the labor-to-leisure tradeoffs.89
Proponents of double distortion recognize that the double-distortion argument
may not always hold but continue to advocate for income tax-based redistribution
on the grounds that the information on non-income attributes is very difficult to elicit
and, therefore, the state should use income as a baseline.90 It is unclear why this
should be true. As Chris Sanchirico explains, all signals of “immutable
characteristics of individuals” are imperfect.91 Because all signals are imperfect,

82

Gamage, supra note 18, at 52. The double-distortion argument rests on several other
assumptions, but these two assumptions receive the most attention.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 53; Liscow, Reducing Inequality, supra note 21, at 2504.
86
Liscow, Reducing Inequality, supra note 21, at 2504.
87
Id.
88
Avraham et al., supra note 51, at 1130.
89
Rich tortfeasors with lower care capacity may optimize their behavior by lowering
their income rather than changing their behavior. See id. at 1143. To be sure, Avraham,
Fortus & Logue do not believe that income redistribution should be done through the legal
system, but that Kaplow & Shavell do not provide a robust basis for using the tax system
over the legal system.
90
See Gamage, supra note 18, at 54.
91
Sanchirico, supra note 51, at 1009.
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there is no a priori reason to favor one signal over another.92 Instead, Sanchirico
argues the state should not make assumptions about equity-efficiency tradeoffs with
respect to tax instruments and should gather information to make this
determination.93
Even if the assumptions underlying the double-distortion argument hold,
scholars suggest that redistribution through a legal rule may still be appropriate. The
double-distortion argument is based on distortions created by income-dependent
changes to legal rules (damages explicitly tied to income) but may not reach incomeindependent changes to legal rules (damages not explicitly tied to income).94
Redistribution through an income-independent change to a legal rule may be less
distortionary than redistribution through the tax code.95
In addition, redistribution through an income tax cannot compensate
individuals for non-monetary harms.96 An income tax cannot effectively redistribute
income to individuals who experience higher morbidity or other health risks as a
result of an efficient legal rule.97 These harms are easiest to conceptualize when
dealing with a polluting factory but may exist in financial markets.98 Private
insurance is theoretically designed to mitigate the costs of these non-monetary
harms, but there are large gaps in the private insurance market, and the poor may not
be able to afford private insurance.99 Where an efficient legal rule results in nonmonetary harms not protected by private insurance, Liscow and Revesz suggest we
should pursue redistribution through a legal rule.

92

Id. at 1010.
Id.
94
See id. at 1017.
95
Liscow provides one example: where the efficiency costs of redistribution through
an income-independent legal rule are cheaper than redistribution through the tax code.
Liscow, Reducing Inequality, supra note 21, at 2482–83. This generally holds where two
rules are equally efficient, but one is more equitable. Id. For example, if efficiency does not
change under either a strict liability rule or negligence standard, a strict liability rule is
preferable because it compensates the victims of pollution below a negligence threshold. Id.
at 2487. See Sanchirico, supra note 51, at 1022. Specifically, Sanchirico explains that an
efficient legal rule is one that maximizes aggregate utility. Id. Because the maximum point
of aggregate utility is mathematically the “point where marginal aggregate utility with
respect to the legal rule is precisely zero,” small departures from the efficient rule that result
in substantially more equity will have negligible efficiency costs. Id.
96
Liscow, Reducing Inequality, supra note 21, at 2505; Revesz, supra note 22, at 1512.
97
Revesz explains that latency and heterogeneity of health harms make the income tax,
which “redistributes on an ex post basis, considering losses and gains already realized,” illsuited to compensate non-monetary harms. Revesz, supra note 22, at 1513–18.
98
See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 881–
84 (2007) (noting potential health and financial harms that may stem from payday lending);
Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 560, 561 (2002).
99
Liscow, Reducing Inequality, supra note 21, at 2506.
93
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2. Tax Gaming
David Gamage offers a more foundational critique of the labor-to-leisure
distortions Kaplow and Shavell’s framework is built around.100 Gamage explains
that the foundational ideas in optimal tax theory were developed at a time when
“both the empirical and theoretical literatures offered reason to infer that labor-toleisure distortions should be a first-order concern for tax design problems.”101 But
recent empirical and theoretical literature suggests “that labor-to-leisure distortion
may be of only secondary importance.”102
The principal empirical insight from the public finance literature is that
taxpayers do not respond to tax increases by trading labor for leisure but instead
respond by gaming the tax system:
[T]he recent empirical literature finds essentially no evidence that highincome taxpayers significantly reduce their labor effort in response to
taxation. In contrast, there is a plethora of evidence documenting that highincome taxpayers respond to taxation through a diverse variety of tax
gaming strategies.103
Building on empirical and theoretical work in public finance, Gamage proposes
a neo-Ramseyian framework to evaluate tax instruments.104 Rather than assume that
one tax instrument105 is always preferable to all other tax instruments, Gamage
suggests policymakers evaluate tax instruments based on the tradeoffs between what
Gamage calls “single-instrument” distortions.106 Single-instrument distortions are
distortions that are unique to a tax instrument, such as tax gaming for a labor tax
increase or behavioral changes in response to an inefficient legal rule.107
Because a labor tax carries single-instrument distortions in the form of tax
gaming, policymakers can minimize the magnitude of the distortionary costs of
redistribution by redistributing income through multiple tax instruments. The upshot
100

Gamage, supra note 18, at 72.
Id. at 4.
102
Id. at 5.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 27–29.
105
Gamage defines a “tax instrument” as “any policy variable that a government might
adjust in order to raise revenues or to promote distributional equity,” which includes legal
rules. Id. at 6.
106
Id. at 27–29.
107
Gamage provides several empirical parameters to evaluate different tax instruments:
“(1) the marginal single-instrument distortions that would be generated by adjusting the tax
rates of each instrument to be evaluated; (2) the marginal instrument-shifting distortions that
would be generated by adjusting the gaps between the effective tax rates of each set of tax
instruments to be evaluated; (3) the distributional implications of adjusting the tax rates of
each tax instrument to be evaluated; and (4) the marginal overhead costs that would be
generated by levying each tax instrument and by adjusting the rates of each tax instrument
to be evaluated.” Id. at 45.
101
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of Gamage’s neo-Ramseyian framework as applied to legal rules is that marginal
amounts of redistribution through legal rules are preferable to relying exclusively on
the tax system.108
(a) Political Constraints and the Invariance Hypothesis
Outside the tax literature, scholars have criticized the double-distortion
argument on several grounds.109 The simplest and most compelling external critique
is the political impediments to redistribution.110 Put simply, there has been no tax
redistribution to offset the distributional costs of efficiency. Complaints that Kaplow
and Shavell ignore the political impediments to redistribution are not new.111 In fact,
Kaplow and Shavell address and largely dismiss these concerns in their original
1994 article:
An argument sometimes offered in favor of redistribution through legal
rules is that the tax system falls short of optimal redistributive taxation—
perhaps because of the balance of political power in the legislature. This
argument raises questions that we do not seek to address about the function
of courts in a democracy. In any case, it seems unlikely that courts can
accomplish significant redistribution through the legal system without
attracting the attention of legislators.112
Lee Fennell and Richard McAdams show that Kaplow and Shavell make
similar arguments in later works.113 Fennell and McAdams argue that Kaplow and
Shavell’s rejection of political constraints as a valid objection to their framework
highlights an implicit assumption that is central to the double-distortion argument:
“the distributive pattern in a society will be invariant to the political form of
redistribution.”114
Fennell and McAdams term this the invariance hypothesis.115 The invariance
hypothesis consists of two separate claims about political invariance. The first, what
Fennell and McAdams term “aspirational invariance,” is “the claim that any effort
108

Id. at 72.
See generally Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion
Argument” Articles are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511 (2005) (arguing against
Kaplow and Shavell’s framework on moral and other grounds); see also Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653
(1998) (challenging the assumptions under the double-distortion argument on behavioral
grounds).
110
See Revesz, supra note 22, at 1492–93.
111
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1074 n.69 (2016).
112
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 18, at 675.
113
Fennell & McAdams, supra note 111, at 1074–76.
114
Id. at 1069–70.
115
Id. at 1055.
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to use legal rules to improve distribution (according to some metric) beyond the level
indicated by the current political equilibrium will be countered by an adjustment to
the tax-and-transfer system that will return distribution to its baseline condition.”116
The second, what Fennell and McAdams term “corrective invariance,” is “the claim
that a legal rule or policy that worsens distribution (according to some metric) will
not have any lasting unwanted effect on distributive results because it will be
corrected through tax-and-transfer.”117
Fennell and McAdams argue that the invariance hypothesis is not ancillary to
Kaplow and Shavell’s framework but the “logical linchpin” of the move from formal
superiority of the tax system to prescriptive superiority of the tax system.118 Because
Kaplow, Shavell, and other law and economics scholars are largely agnostic about
distribution, prescriptive tax superiority can only be justified on the grounds “that
any distributive pattern that is politically achievable at all can . . . be achieved
through the tax system.”119 If the converse were true, then a distributive outcome
through a legal rule might be superior to a distributive outcome through the tax code
due to political constraints. But, per Kaplow and Shavell, a superior distributive
result outside the tax system will ultimately be undone by the state because a
society’s distributive equilibrium is fully captured by its tax system.120
The invariance hypothesis is plainly false. With respect to corrective
invariance, there is little evidence that we redistribute income through the tax system
to correct for inequality in the legal system.121 Indeed, as Fennell and McAdams
note, “the tax-and-transfer system has not generally adjusted over time to correct for
changes in the national income distribution.”122 And the major changes to the tax
law have been regressive and contractionary as opposed to progressive and
expansionary.123 With respect to aspirational invariance, there is little evidence that
policymakers undo redistribution outside the tax system. In fact, empirical evidence
suggests the opposite is true: that distributional effects are sticky and are not undone
legislatively.124
116

Id. at 1077.
Id.
118
Id. at 1070.
119
Fennell & McAdams, supra note 111, at 1071.
120
See id. at 1057.
121
Id. at 1080 (noting that while “[i]t is . . . possible that Congress responds nimbly
through tax policy to distributive changes that emanate from legal rules . . . it is difficult to
imagine the set of institutional features that would produce such a pattern”).
122
Id. at 1079.
123
David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske,
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane,
David Miller, Daniel Shaviro & Manoj Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax
Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439,
1441, 1487 (2019) (stating that the 2017 tax legislation, “the most expansive tax legislation
in decades,” was largely regressive, with major reductions in corporate and income taxes).
124
See Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts
from School Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 6 (2018).
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(b) Efficiency’s Costs
The most serious challenge to Kaplow and Shavell’s framework comes from
Liscow’s work on efficiency.125 Liscow’s work shows that pursuing efficiency in
legal rule design and ignoring distribution has costs.126 Efficiency carries a systemic
bias towards the rich.127 If the distributional inequity of efficiency is not offset by
redistributive tax policy, then efficiency’s costs can compound over time and expand
the wealth gap.128
Liscow’s work raises the question of what the distributional consequences of
efficient policies are. To answer that question, Liscow first explains the way
efficiency is defined in the law and economics literature. Efficiency typically means
Kaldor-Hicks (“K-H”) efficiency, which “measures the willingness to pay of the
parties affected by various policy options and then chooses the policy that
maximizes the sum of the willingness to pay of those parties.”129 K-H efficiency
“seeks the arrangement of goods, services, and externalities” that, given existing
wealth distribution, maximize surplus.130 Unlike Pareto efficiency, K-H efficiency
is satisfied if a set of policies increases the economic pie but leaves some individuals
worse off.
To evaluate the distributional consequences of efficient policies, Liscow
introduces a simple taxonomy of distributional outcomes—efficient policies can be
neutral, rich-biased, or poor-biased:
Neutral efficient policies do not change the distribution of legal
entitlements to individuals as their income increases. Rich-biased efficient
policies distribute more of a legal entitlement to individuals as their
income increases. Poor-biased efficient policies distribute less of a legal
entitlement to individuals as their income increases.131
Liscow shows that efficient policies are often rich-biased because efficiency
measures willingness to pay. The intuition behind this result can be explained in
terms of utility. A good is rich-biased if “the marginal utility of consumption
decreases with income more rapidly than the marginal utility of the good decreases
with income.”132 Conversely, a good is poor-biased if the marginal utility of
consumption decreases with income less rapidly than the marginal utility of
income.133 In simpler terms, “as a person’s income increases, her willingness to pay
for a good is measured by how much she would rather have another unit of that good
125

Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23.
Id.
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Id. at 1656.
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Liscow & Paez, supra note 27.
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Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23, at 1658.
130
Id. at 1658–59.
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Id. at 1667.
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versus another dollar.”134 Because of the declining marginal utility of income, the
rich are generally more willing to pay for things. For an efficient policy to be poorbiased, the poor must gain more utility than the rich, which can only happen if the
rich derive very little utility from a policy.
Liscow gives examples of rich-biased policy, which includes public spending
on pharmaceutical research, road safety, law enforcement, voting, and
transportation.135 In fact, policies that rely on efficiency analysis, such as regulatory
cost-benefit analysis, often display a bias towards the rich.136 Liscow illustrates this
point by describing the procedure the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) uses
to allocate funds. DOT relies on the value of time travel savings (“VTTS”) to
determine how to allocate transportation funds. Under this approach, more funds are
allocated for air and high-speed rail than other modes of transportation. As a DOT
memorandum explains: “Since these modes charge higher fares to travelers who
place a greater value on time saving, it is reasonable to derive a distinct VTTS from
the higher incomes of their passengers.”137
Recent work from Liscow and Daniel Paez suggests that the costs of rich-biased
efficient policies can compound over time.138 The basic idea is that the costs of richbiased policies pursued in period one will be more severe in subsequent periods if
there are no distributional offsets. To illustrate this point, Liscow and Paez return to
the familiar example of a polluting factory operating under a strict liability regime.
In period one, the factory must decide whether to locate in a rich neighborhood or a
poor neighborhood.139 Because damages in the poor neighborhood will be lower than
in the rich neighborhood, the factory chooses to locate in the poor neighborhood.140
In period two, a new factory must decide between the rich and poor neighborhood.
Because wages in the poor neighborhood are lower because of pollution, the factory
chooses the poor neighborhood, further depressing wages.141 The cycle continues in
subsequent periods leading to what Liscow and Paez term “inequality
snowballing.”142
II. EFFICIENCY AND PREDATION: THE PROBLEM OF FRINGE FINANCE
Critics of the double-distortion argument generally do not suggest we abandon
efficiency as the touchstone for regulatory design. Instead, they propose modest
measures to introduce equity into the analysis.143 In this Part, I sketch out why we
134

Id. at 1682.
Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23, at 1674–76.
136
See id. at 1688.
137
Id. at 1690.
138
Liscow & Paez, supra note 27.
139
Id. at 2.
140
Id. at 3.
141
Id.
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Id. at 2.
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Gamage proposed a neo-Ramseyian framework. See infra Section II.B.3; Fennell
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should abandon efficiency as the primary touchstone for regulatory design in
consumer financial markets. To make this case, I build on Liscow’s observation that
initial resource allocations can affect allocations in subsequent periods.
If DOT allocates more transportation resources to a rich neighborhood in period
one, living standards in a poor neighborhood may decline. In period two, DOT is
likely to allocate even more resources to the rich neighborhood because the rich are
more willing to pay, and the poor are less willing (or able) to pay. In consumer
financial regulation, the issue is often deallocation or deregulation. In period one,
public assistance to the poor is cut back. Fringe financial products emerge to fill in
gaps in the social safety net. In period two, policymakers attempt to rein in
“predatory” practices by fringe financiers. But, for the reasons explained below,
these interventions could be inefficient and diminish aggregate utility. Inter-period
redistribution can change these dynamics. But if there is no inter-period
redistribution and policymakers are bound by efficiency, the initial decision to
allocate or deallocate resources can become entrenched.144
In this Part, I explain how initial decisions to deallocate resources structure the
boundaries of policymaking in subsequent time periods.
A. Inferiority and Marginal Utility
As explained in Part I, a good is poor-biased if the marginal utility of
consumption decreases with income less rapidly than the marginal utility of the
good. Because of the declining marginal utility of income, poor-biased goods are
exceedingly rare. Liscow explains, “poor-biased goods are equivalent to what
economists term ‘inferior’ goods, for which demand increases as income
decreases.”145 As an example, bus-based transportation could be an inferior good
because an individual’s willingness to pay likely increases as the individual’s
income decreases.
Although inferior goods are generally uncommon, products resembling inferior
goods (though not goods themselves) are common in fringe financial markets.
Payday loans, title loans, pawn loans, and bail bonds primarily exist to meet the
needs of poor consumers. These products generally do not have rich analogs, and
rich consumers derive virtually no utility from the existence of these products. The
existence of products with the properties of inferior goods poses a problem for
and McAdams propose further research to determine when political action costs favor
redistribution outside tax-and-transfer. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 111, at 1124.
Liscow proposes a simple decision tree for distributionally informed efficiency analysis.
Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23, at 1695. If a policy is rich-biased and the distributional
consequences are sticky, the policymaker should adopt an inefficient policy that is
distributionally neutral. Id. If the policy is neither rich-biased nor are the distributional
consequences sticky, then the policymaker can adopt the efficient policy without
modification. Id.
144
The emergence of payday loans and debate around the regulation of payday loans
largely captures these dynamics. See infra Section II.B.
145
Liscow, Efficiency, supra note 23, at 1678.
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policymakers who seek to regulate fringe financial markets within an efficiency
framework.
Because demand for inferior goods is inversely related to income, the poor are
generally more willing to pay for inferior goods than the rich. Figure 1 shows
consumer willingness to pay as a function of income for an inferior good:146

As Figure 1 shows, richer consumers are generally less willing to pay for
inferior goods and derive much less utility from inferior goods. Thus, rich consumers
prefer to keep their income because the marginal utility of income is greater than the
negligible utility of inferior goods.
Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between income and willingness to pay
for an inferior good or product with inferior good-like properties is linear. But this
is likely incorrect. Demand may be discontinuous at the point where cheaper
alternatives exist. For example, demand for private transportation may be lower
where public substitutes exist. Similarly, demand for high-cost, small-dollar credit
may be lower where low-income consumers are eligible for public assistance. We
can represent this discontinuity graphically by introducing a “Safety Net” block at
the bottom of the income distribution.

146

Id. at 1716.
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Figure 2 suggests that the relationship between willingness to pay and income
for an inferior good or product with similar properties is discontinuous at the point
where the public safety net’s protections are triggered. Low-income consumers
eligible for public assistance are unwilling to pay for private substitutes. What
happens when the welfare state contracts? Figure 3 shows a shrinking safety net
with private substitutes replacing public assistance.

We can think of Figure 2 and Figure 3 as representing two sequential periods
in a policymaking world. In the first period, represented by Figure 2, the safety net
eliminates demand for a particular inferior good at the lowest-income deciles. In the
second period, represented by Figure 3, the safety net shrinks and serves only the
lowest-income consumers. Because there are no offsetting public transfers, safety
net reductions generate new demand for private substitutes.
Any regulation that sets out to decrease the availability of private substitutes
after the second period runs the risk of being criticized as inefficient. The basic
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argument is that because the poor are generally willing to pay quite a lot for these
private substitutes, restricting access may diminish aggregate utility. Somewhat
perversely, as Figures 2 and 3 suggest, efficiency-based arguments against the
regulation of inferior-like goods grow stronger as the welfare state contracts and
demand for these products increases.147
As an example, assume the state shrinks cash transfers to the poor by a marginal
amount. This marginal decrease in welfare triggers a marginal increase in demand
for extremely expensive, short-term loans known as “fast cash loans.”148 Because
interest rates generally reflect risk and risk is negatively correlated with income, the
annual percentage rate (“APR”) for fast cash loans was 350% prior to the welfare
contraction.
Following the welfare contraction, fast cash lenders expand access to fast cash
loans to meet the resulting new demand. Although risk is negatively correlated with
income, the relationship is not necessarily linear. Small decreases in income,
particularly at the lower end of the income spectrum, may be associated with very
large increases in credit risk.149 As a result, the new fast cash loans carry an APR of
1,000%. Pesky consumer advocates argue the rates for these new fast cash loans are
predatory and push for legislation capping the interest rate on fast cash loans. The
industry fights back: the new fast cash loans may be expensive but reflect the
revealed preferences of poor consumers. Moreover, the added premium reflects a
real increase in credit risk that poor consumers are willing to pay for. Restricting
access to fast cash loans will diminish aggregate utility.
Substitute payday loans or title loans for fast cash loans, and you have the basic
contours of the debates over regulation in consumer law. Consumer advocates and
scholars generally respond to efficiency arguments by attempting to demonstrate
that regulation will not diminish aggregate utility.150 The market may not reflect
147

An interest rate cap issued after the contraction in the social safety net (Figure 3)
may diminish aggregate social surplus more than the same cap prior to the contraction
(Figure 2), because there is no inter-period redistribution to absorb the additional demand
(represented by the blue-shaded region in Figure 3). As a result, certain consumers will either
be shut of credit markets with offsetting transfers or forced to obtain costlier substitutes they
derive utility from. It is important to note that there is some debate in the literature about
substitution effects. See Angela K. Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would
Credit Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending
Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 418–19 (2009). My purpose here is not to suggest
that interest rate caps will necessarily result in diminished aggregate utility but rather to
illustrate how these assumptions structure debates over the wisdom of consumer credit
regulation.
148
Or, more accurately, Fa$t Ca$h Loan$.
149
See Stefania Albanesi, Giacomo De Giorgi & Jaromir Nosal, Credit Growth and the
Financial Crisis: A New Narrative, 17–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
23740, 2017) (discussing the relationship between income and credit risk); but see Rachael
Beer, Felicia Ionescu & Geng Li, Are Income and Credit Scores Highly Correlated?, FED.
RESERVE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/areincome-and-credit-scores-highly-correlated-20180813.htm [https://perma.cc/FGV2-JC79].
150
See infra Section II.B.3.
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actual revealed preferences because consumers are present-biased or overly
optimistic. But the evidence that consumers are present-biased or overly optimistic
might be thin.151
And even if consumers are present-biased, critics argue this may not be bad. If
a present bias encourages consumers to overconsume goods they undervalue, then
market-corrective interventions could be regressive. These regulations will likely
limit access to credit for some consumers. The consumers shut out of credit markets
are most likely at the bottom of the income spectrum and the ones who benefit the
most from expensive products with complex price structures. Because there will be
no redistribution through the tax system to offset these costs, critics contend that any
regulation of fringe finance is arguably both inefficient and regressive.
The following sections show how these dynamics play out in debates over the
regulation of payday loans and refund anticipation loans.
B. Payday Loans
Payday loans are small loans extended for short terms at a very high cost.152
Payday loans are typically directly or indirectly tied to a consumer’s paycheck, and
the term for a conventional payday loan is fourteen days or the time between a
consumer’s paydays.153 The annualized cost of a payday loan can be quite high: from
391% to well over 1,000%.154 Although payday loans are formally short-term, they
are functionally longer-term, revolving lines of credit. Payday loans are typically
rolled over by consumers multiple times and are best understood as a high-cost
alternative to credit cards or bank overdrafts.155
In his 1996 book on elite dissensus over Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (“AFDC”), Steven Teles observed that “[d]espite the relatively modest
amounts the nation spends on AFDC, welfare is one of the most ideological,
emotional, and contentious issues in U.S. politics today.”156 Much the same can be
said about payday loans today. Payday loans account for a relatively small slice of
151

See infra Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3.
See What Is a Payday Loan?, CFPB (June 2, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance
.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/ [https://perma.cc/2T2Z-2LCP].
153
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54,472, 54,477 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
154
See id. (noting that the median storefront payday loan fee is $15 per $100 borrowed,
which results in an annualized cost of credit of 391% for a fourteen-day loan); see also King
ex rel. v. B&B Inv. Group, Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 662 (N.M. 2014) (noting that defendants’ loan
products carried APRs between 1,147.14% and 1,500%).
155
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 54,484; Robert DeYoung & Ronnie J. Phillips, Payday Loan Pricing 6 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank
Kan. City Econ. Rsch. Dep’t, Working Paper, RWP 09-07, 2009) (“The centrality of the
bank account in the payday loan production function suggests that the closest competitive
substitutes for payday loans are not the products offered by fringe financiers, but the
overdraft protection offered by mainstream banks, thrifts, and credit unions.”).
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STEVEN M. TELES, WHOSE WELFARE? AFDC AND ELITE POLITICS vii (1996).
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the overall consumer financial market.157 Despite its modest market share, the
regulation of payday loans, like the reform of AFDC three decades ago, is one of the
most ideological, emotional, and contentious issues in consumer law.158 Much like
AFDC received disproportionate attention from poverty law scholars relative to its
size, payday loans receive disproportionate attention from consumer law scholars.159
The disproportionate scholarly attention to the regulation of payday loans stems
in part from the extreme facts surrounding these transactions. Consider the following
description of a consumer transaction from a recent case:
One borrower, Oscar Wellito, testified that he took out a signature loan
from Defendants after he went bankrupt. He was supporting school-aged
children while trying to service debt obligations with two other small loan
companies. He earned about $9 an hour at a Safeway grocery store, which
was not enough money to make ends meet, yet too much money to qualify
157

In 2018, combined storefront and online payday loan volume was $29.2 billion. See
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382,
44,384 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041). By comparison, outstanding
non-household debt the same year was $4.01 trillion. See Household Debt and Credit Report,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK: CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc [https://perma.cc/JUB4-2X2D] (last
visited Sept. 15, 2021).
158
See Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 15, at 1106 (“The debates over how best to
provide credit to high-risk, low-income borrowers and, relatedly, how best to regulate the
fringe lenders who are most likely to lend to such borrowers, have been particularly
vociferous with regard to payday lending.”); LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA:
HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 81 (2017) (“Payday loans are perhaps the most
hotly debated topic in the area of consumer financial services.”).
159
See, e.g., Yonathan A. Arbel, Payday, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2020) (excavating
the legal architecture behind a bi-weekly paycheck system that pushes low-wage workers
into payday loans); Jim Hawkins, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending, 101
BOS. U. L. REV. 705 (2021) (examining the virtues of earned wage access products as a less
costly alternative to payday loans); Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday
Loans Cause Bankruptcy?, 62 J. L. & ECON. 485 (2019) (suggesting that payday lending
leads to increased personal bankruptcy claims); Jacob Hale Russell, Misbehavioral Law and
Economics, 51 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 549 (2018) (analyzing the problem of heterogeneous
preferences in payday loan regulation); Julia Merton, Payday Lending and Its Regulation, 36
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 52 (2016) (describing a proposed CFPB rule to curtail payday
lending); Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L.
REV. 373 (2015) (applying a human-rights framework to the regulation of small-dollar, high
cost loans); Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2010); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury
Laws, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion of American Credit
Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 98; Steven M.
Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and
Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005); Creola
Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1
(2002).
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for public assistance. “That’s why,” he testified, “I had no choice of
getting these loans, to feed my kids, to live from one paycheck to another
paycheck.” He needed money for groceries, gas, laundry soap, and
“whatever we need to survive from one payday to another payday.” Mr.
Wellito borrowed $100 from Defendants. His loan carried a 1,147.14 APR
and required repayment in twenty-six biweekly installments of $40.16
with a final payment of $55.34. Thus, the $100 loan carried a total finance
charge of $999.71.160
Analyzing extreme transactions such as Mr. Wellito’s can help us think through
foundational descriptive and normative questions in consumer law.161 Why were Mr.
Wellito’s options constrained in this manner? What accounts for the structure and
features of the market for small-dollar, high-cost loans? Should the law intervene to
set this transaction aside? Why? If the law has no role in this transaction, when does
the law have a role?
Efficiency analysis instructs us to ignore this rich set of questions. Instead of
questioning the structure and shape of consumer financial markets, we should limit
our inquiry to one question: does Mr. Wellito want this loan? If the loan is a private
substitute for welfare and has the properties of an inferior good, the answer is almost
certainly yes. The next sections discuss payday loans as welfare substitutes, the
empirical literature on payday lending, and the debate over the CFPB’s Payday Rule.
1. Payday Loans as Welfare Substitutes
Small loans secured by a consumer’s income are not new. At the turn of the
twentieth century, there was a growing unregulated market for fringe financial
products such as chattel loans, salary loans, and salary purchases.162 These early
antecedents to modern payday loans flourished in dense, urban centers and were
often structured to evade strict state usury laws.163 The early and unregulated market
for fringe finance was eventually brought within the scope of state law, and demand
for expensive small loans appeared to diminish.164
The modern iteration of payday lending began in the late 1980s at checkcashing stores.165 Check cashers began accepting “deferred presentment checks”—
160

King ex rel. v. B&B Inv. Group, Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 664 (N.M. 2014) (finding the
products at issue in the case were longer-term loans the defendants offered to evade state
payday lending restrictions).
161
But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679–81 (2011) (describing tales of consumer misfortune as “trouble
stories” and doubting the value of these anecdotes as a basis for regulation).
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See ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE 13 (2018).
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See id.
164
As Fleming explains, the decline in small-sum lending was likely a function of both
changing demand and rising costs that made this kind of lending under then existing
regulations less profitable. Id. at 225–28.
165
See id. at 237–38.
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post-dated checks that were cashed by the store for a discount.166 The checks were
often post-dated for fourteen days or the length of time between pay periods.167 The
discount between the amount of the post-dated check and the amount the consumer
received reflected interest.168 Deferred presentment checks eventually morphed into
the modern varieties of payday loans.169
Since the 1990s, the payday lending industry has experienced rapid growth with
“payday loan volume expand[ing] fivefold to almost $50 billion from the late 1990s
to the mid-2000s . . . .”170 Although this growth has slowed down in recent years,
recent data suggests that demand for and consumption of payday loans remain quite
high.171 Why did payday loans seem to disappear in the middle of the twentieth
century and then reemerge in the late 1980s?
One answer is that early-twentieth-century payday lending was a relatively
modest industry. There are moral hazard and adverse selection risks associated with
payday lending, and the original payday lenders lacked the tools to adequately screen
potential borrowers.172 Technological innovations such as credit scoring in the
middle of the twentieth century may have “substantially mitigated these costs” and
led to the reemergence and growth of payday lending.173 In addition, the American
consumer economy was less developed in the early twentieth century,174 and perhaps
there was just less demand for payday loans.
The more conventional account is the reemergence of payday lending was a
product of financial deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s.175 Per this account, the
financial needs of low-income individuals were served by a diverse array of financial
institutions during much of the twentieth century. These institutions, which included
166
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See id. at 238.
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Neil Bhutta, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loan Choices and
Consequences, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 223, 227 (2015).
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See Hunt Allcott, Joshua Kim, Dmitry Taubinsky & Jonathan Zinman, Are HighInterest Loans Predatory? Theory and Evidence from Payday Lending 6 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. s28799, 2021) (“In 2016, Americans borrowed $35 billion
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See DeYoung & Phillips, supra note 155, at 4 (describing that in the early 1900s
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Id. at 4–5.
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THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 5 (2014) (explaining that
“[t]here simply were few needs before the 1920s” for consumer credit and that “[m]uch of
the demand for consumer credit arose with the development of urbanization, mass production
of consumer goods, and growth of the middle class” after World War II).
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See, e.g., Barr, Banking, supra note 13, at 152; Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor
Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 487 (2013) [hereinafter Baradaran, Poor];
FLEMING, supra note 162, at 235–40.
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credit unions, savings and loans, industrial loan companies, personal finance
companies, and traditional banks, decreased demand for predatory and unregulated
“loan sharks.”176 The emergence of new financial instruments and institutions in the
middle of the twentieth century (e.g., credit cards, home equity lines of credit, and
money market mutual funds), however, fundamentally unsettled this balance.177
Facing increased competition, banks put pressure on Congress to eliminate
restrictions on deposits and lending.178 Congress, aided by the Supreme Court,
responded to this pressure with a number of deregulatory moves in the 1970s and
early 1980s that fundamentally altered the consumer financial landscape.179 The
initial deregulation of consumer financial markets had two consequences. First,
conventional financial institutions (such as credit unions) that previously served
low-income communities faced intense competitive pressure as a result of banking
deregulation.180 These institutions responded by dropping services for low-income
consumers and pushing federal and state governments for further deregulation.181
Second, less conventional financial institutions (such as personal finance
companies) abandoned low-income communities for newer and more profitable
opportunities created by deregulation.182 Thus, deregulation precipitated an
unraveling of traditional financial services for low-income consumers. Payday
lenders stepped into this financial vacuum to serve the needs of low-income
consumers.
The deregulation story is a compelling one, but it suggests that welfare state
contractions played little role in the recent growth of payday loans. There are some
reasons to doubt this is true. First, the growth in payday lending lagged financial
deregulation by over a decade. Although payday loans emerged in the late 1980s,
much of the growth in the industry took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s.183
This growth tracks reductions in the welfare state, culminating in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”),
176

35.
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See Baradaran, Poor, supra note 175, at 486–87; FLEMING, supra note 162, at 231–

See FLEMING, supra note 162, at 231–35 (discussing the growth of credit cards and
home equity lines of credit); Baradaran, Poor, supra note 175, at 514–15 (describing the
emergence of money market mutual funds and deregulatory pressure).
178
See FLEMING, supra note 162, at 228–31.
179
Id. (describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the preemptive scope of the
National Bank Act in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service
Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), and deregulatory efforts that followed to level the playing field
between federal and state-chartered banks); see also Baradaran, Poor, supra note 175, at 515
(describing efforts to repeal Regulation Q).
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which replaced AFDC with Temporary Aid for Needy Families (“TANF”).184 AFDC
was a means-tested program that provided monthly cash assistance to families with
limited restrictions.185 TANF, by contrast, was designed to have a much smaller
footprint. TANF “imposed lifetime limits on receiving aid, subjected able-bodied
participants to work requirements, incentivized states to cut welfare rolls, and
transformed welfare into a block grant program that gave states wide flexibility in
how they spend welfare funds.”186 These restrictions dramatically reduced
enrollment such that “the public safety net is by many accounts dead.”187
Second, Prasad’s analysis of the demand for credit in advanced industrial
economies suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the
welfare state and demand for credit.188 Per Prasad, “deregulation is associated with
a higher demand for credit in countries where the welfare state is less well developed
but not in countries where the welfare state is well developed.”189 To be sure,
Prasad’s analysis does not suggest that deregulation is irrelevant but that both
deregulation and the size of the welfare state impact the demand for credit. As Prasad
explains:
If the rise of credit were simply a response to the easier availability of
credit rather than to demand for credit, deregulation would lead to a
similar rise in credit in developed welfare states. Because it does not, we
may conclude that deregulation allows the credit-welfare state trade-off to
emerge: regulation suppresses credit in less well-developed welfare states,
while deregulation allows the credit-financed consumption of goods and
services that would be provided by the welfare state elsewhere.190
Prasad is not strictly looking at payday loans. Prasad’s analysis is based on
household debt across advanced industrial economies.191 But there is some empirical
and administrative data that suggests a negative correlation between the availability
of cash transfers and the demand for payday loans. Paige Skiba finds some evidence
that the availability of small tax rebates may diminish short-run demand for certain

184
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 244 (2017)
[hereinafter Greene, Bootstrap].
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Id. at 236.
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Id. at 236–37 (noting that the number of welfare recipients dropped 81 percent from
14.2 million in 1994 to 2.7 million in 2016).
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See PRASAD, supra note 36, at 235.
189
Id.
190
Id. (internal citation omitted).
191
Id. at 229 (using “household debt minus household assets as a percent of GDP for
the dependent variable” for a regression analysis on the relationship of credit and welfare
across advanced industrial countries).
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credit-constrained borrowers.192 Administrative data also suggests there may be a
relationship between the availability of public transfers and demand for payday
loans.
Below is data from the Division of Financial Institutions of the Illinois
Department of Financial & Professional Regulation on the monthly transaction
volume for various small-dollar loans in Illinois collected from 2012–2019.193
Illinois law previously imposed mandatory reporting obligations on licensed smalldollar lenders and issued annual reports compiling this data.194 The figure below195
shows the transaction volume for four types of small-dollar loans permitted in
Illinois law prior to 2021: 1) small consumer loans (“SCL”)¾loans of $4,000 or less
with a maximum APR of 99%; 2) payday loans (“PL”)¾loans with a term of 45
days or less and a maximum APR of 404%; 3) installment payday loans
(“IPL”)¾loans with terms of 180 days or less and a maximum APR of 404%; and
4) title loans (“Title”)¾loans of $4,000 or less secured by a consumer’s vehicle.196
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See Paige Marta Skiba, Tax Rebates and the Cycle of Payday Borrowing, 16 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 550 (2014) (finding that a $300 tax rebate decreased the short-run probability
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https://www.idfpr.com/Forms/DFI/CCD/IL%20Trends%20Report%202019.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/4V9U-SFU2]. The figure was producted by Veritec Solutions on behalf of the Illinois
Department of Financial & Professional Regulation. Use of the figure in this Article was
authorized by the Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation and Veritec
Solutions.
194
Illinois previously required certain lenders licensed in Illinois to report information
to an approved third-party reporting service for each transaction. This information was
reported at the time a transaction was entered into or shortly thereafter. The compiled
information was then aggregated and summarized in annual reports. See Illinois Trends
Report, supra note 193, at 6 (describing Illinois then-existing reporting requirements).
195
Illinois Trends Report, supra note 193, at 9.
196
The definitions for each of these loans existed in scattered parts of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes and the Administrative Code. See id. at 2 (referencing the various relevant
statutes). On March 23, 2021, Illinois passed the Predatory Loan Prevention Act, which
capped the rates for all consumer loans at 36% and repealed prior inconsistent law. S.B.
1792, 101st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); see Kate Berry, Illinois Caps Interest Rates
on Consumer Loans at 36%, AMERICAN BANKER (Jan. 15, 2021, 1:15 PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/illinois-caps-interest-rates-on-consumer-loans-at36 [https://perma.cc/7JXD-VWB8].
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The figure shows a pattern of seasonal borrowing with decreased transaction volume
from January through March of each year. This pattern is interesting for a few
reasons. The decreased transaction volume correlates with the availability of the
earned income tax credit (“EITC”). And the pattern is relatively consistent across
the different small-dollar loans. This suggests that the substitution effects across
different small-dollar loans may be smaller than the substitution between smalldollar loans and cash transfers. This pattern tracks some findings in the literature on
the substitution effects between different loan products.197
This evidence is certainly not conclusive. However, when the studies cited in
this section are viewed together, it suggests we should view monocausal
explanations of payday loan growth with some skepticism.
2. Payday Loan Demand
The extensive empirical literature on payday lending suggests that most of the
demand for payday loans comes from credit-constrained consumers.198 Much of the
literature focuses on the welfare effects of payday lending. And on this account, the
literature is mixed, with some studies finding that payday loans are arguably welfare197
See Littwin, supra note 147. In fact, payday lenders themselves tend to view public
spending as an important competitive threat. See David Dayen, Payday Lenders Suffer Rare
Attack of Honesty, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 11, 2019), https://prospect.org/power/paydaylenders-suffer-rare-attack-of-honesty/ [https://perma.cc/K6Y2-8WBP] (noting payday
lending industry opposition to Arizona legislation that would increase the minimum wage).
198
See, e.g., Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28,
30 (2011) (“Individuals restricted in access to credit [offered by mainstream banking,
mortgage companies and credit cards] often resort to borrowing from high interest lenders.”);
Bhutta et al., supra note 170, at 231 (“[I]nitial payday loan applications occur precisely when
consumers’ access to liquidity from mainstream creditors is lowest.”); Payday, Vehicle Title,
and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472, 54,474 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041) (“[C]onsumers living paycheck to paycheck and with little
to no savings have also used credit as a means of coping with financial shortfalls.”).
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enhancing199 and other studies finding the payday loans have zero or negative
welfare effects.200
The mixed results stem in part from the difficulty distinguishing between good
and bad uses of payday loans. Payday loans can either provide emergency liquidity
or supplement a consumer’s income.201 As emergency liquidity, payday loans are
arguably useful. A credit-constrained consumer may need emergency funds after a
medical emergency or other exogenous shock.202 As an income supplement, payday
loans are arguably more problematic. A consumer who relies on payday loans to
supplement their income and smooth consumption intertemporally may not
understand the true cost of a payday loan or the consumer’s default risk.203

199

See, e.g., Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey
Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546 (2010) (finding
that restricting access to payday loans caused deterioration in the overall financial condition
of Oregon households with former payday loan users shifting partially into plausibly inferior
alternatives); Morse, supra note 198 (finding positive welfare effects associated with payday
lending following natural disaster); Donald P. Morgan, Michael R. Strain & Ihab Seblani,
How Payday Credit Access Affects Overdrafts and Other Outcomes, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 519 (2012) (finding mixed welfare effects: payday bans decrease Chapter 13
rates but increase complaints against lenders and debt collectors and shifting into bank
overdraft); Susan Carter & Bill Skimmyhorn, Much Ado About Nothing? New Evidence on
the Effects of Payday Lending on Military Members, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 606, 606 (2017)
(finding few adverse effects for service members with payday loan access).
200
See, e.g., Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access
and Military Personnel Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805 (2014) (finding payday loan
access causes financial distress and severe misbehavior for relatively young, inexperienced,
and financially unsophisticated airmen; and finding negative welfare effects were larger in
high unemployment areas with payday lending); Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit
Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market, 126 Q. J. ECON. 517 (2011) (finding no
evidence that payday loans alleviate economic hardship and evidence that loan access leads
to increased difficulty paying mortgage, rent and utilities bills); Bhutta et al., supra note 170
(finding the long-run effect of payday borrowing on credit scores and other measures of
financial well-being is close to zero).
201
See, e.g., Atkinson, Rethinking, supra note 15, at 1107 (distinguishing payday loans
as a limited solution to unexpected emergency expenses but also as a poor solution to
recurring expenses); Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1027–28 (2012) (noting that “if a consumer’s car breaks down
and she would be fired if she could not get to work tomorrow, it may be rational for her to
borrow at extremely high interest rather than forgo all wage income for the foreseeable
future”; but payday loans may not be utility-enhancing if used “for purposes other than
avoiding emergency situations”).
202
See Morse, supra note 198, at 28–29 (noting that “[i]ndividuals frequently
experience some sort of personal emergency (e.g., an out-of-pocket medical expense or car
breakdown) leaving them without cash for their short-term obligations” and in these common
scenarios, payday lenders can be “heroes”).
203
See Skiba, supra note 201, at 1032 (“Payday loans can help consumers if used
sparingly and for emergencies—they have never been meant for long-term credit.”).
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Because payday loans are formally closed but functionally revolving, it can be
difficult to tell if a consumer has taken out a payday loan on an emergency basis or
is using the payday loan to supplement their income. In both cases, the consumer
will likely default on their initial obligation and roll the loan over one or more times.
The optimal policy should strike a balance between permitting useful emergency
credit and limiting harmful consumption credit.204 Evaluating different state law
restrictions on payday lending, Paige Skiba suggests that laws that set restrictions
on rollovers and renewals strike this balance better than outright bans on payday
loans.205 These laws would arguably encourage welfare-enhancing short-term
borrowing but discourage welfare-diminishing long-term borrowing.
Skiba’s conclusion was based, in part, on an assumption that payday loans that
are repeatedly rolled over are not welfare-enhancing.206 But it is not clear this is
correct. The literature on the welfare effects of payday loans generally ignores
consumer preferences. But consumer preferences matter for consumer welfare
analysis. When the literature discusses consumer preferences, there is an assumption
that short-term borrowing does not reflect revealed preferences because creditconstrained consumers are present-biased (significantly discount future benefits) or
overly optimistic (hold unrealistic expectations about the future).207 Recent
scholarship suggests that these assumptions are either insufficient to justify
regulatory intervention or wrong.
For example, Andrew Hayashi suggests that present-biased consumption may
be welfare-enhancing.208 In particular, when durable goods with deferred benefits
are bundled with loans, a seemingly misleading cost structure may encourage utilitymaximizing consumption.209 As Hayashi explains, “credit products with low initial
costs and higher backend costs are less pernicious, and may, in fact, be beneficial,
when they must be used to finance the purchase of a good or service with deferred
benefits.”210 The key, for Hayashi, is the cost structure may make the benefits of the
good more salient and the costs less salient:
The teaser loan converts the temporal pattern of costs and benefits
associated with the durable good (which from a rational perspective she
should buy) from one that is unappealing to her—because it involves
incurring current costs to generate future benefits—to one that is appealing
204

See id. at 1045.
Id. at 1029.
206
Id. at 1028.
207
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 11, at 44–46 (“A customer who misestimates her
ability to repay the loan in fourteen days will likely roll the loan over . . . .”); PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOW BORROWERS CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS (2013),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/02/20/pew_choosing_borrowing_payday_
feb2013-(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/JK8W-P2Y6] (emphasizing the premise that borrowers
“hold unrealistic expectations about payday loans”).
208
Hayashi, supra note 8, at 693.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 709–10.
205
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because it provides current benefits in exchange for deferred costs. The
individual is effectively tempted through the financing to do the right thing
with respect to the durable good purchase.211
For Hayashi, present-biased consumers may undervalue socially desirable
consumption if it is only accessible through conventionally structured loans.212
Complex pricing, such as a low-teaser that resets to a higher rate based on a
fluctuating index, that corrects this bias may be utility-maximizing, and regulation
that discourages unconventional cost structures may be harmful and regressive.
Hayashi assumes scholars and regulators correctly capture the behavioral
dynamics of consumer credit transactions but challenges their welfare
conclusions.213 Others, however, question whether scholars and regulators analyze
the behavioral psychology correctly. For example, Ronald Mann has questioned the
general conclusion that payday consumers are overly optimistic.214 In 2012, Mann
designed a survey to test for present bias in payday lending.215 Mann’s survey, which
was given at the time consumers initially took out a payday loan from a large
national payday lender, asked how long consumers expected to continue borrowing
and stay in debt.216 Mann compared the survey answers to loan performance data the
lender provided. The results of Mann’s survey revealed several surprising results:
(1) “most borrowers expected that they would continue borrowing for some time
after the initial loan”; (2) “60 percent of the borrowers predicted the final repayment
date with reasonable accuracy”; and (3) the “strongest and most consistently
significant predictor of accuracy” was “heavy prior use of the product” and not
demographics.217
In 2019, Hunt Allcott, Joshua Kim, Dmitry Taubinsky, and Jonathan Zinman
conducted a more robust survey to test for present bias in payday lending.218 The
2019 survey offered experimental incentives to test consumers’ ability to accurately
predict their likelihood of reborrowing. Consumers could choose between two
211

Id. at 706.
Or what Elizabeth Warren calls “plain vanilla” loans. Elizabeth Warren, Three
Myths About the Consumer Financial Product Agency, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (July 21,
2009), https://baselinescenario.com/2009/07/21/three-myths-about-the-consumer-financialproduct-agency/ [https://perma.cc/2Y7T-VL5Y].
213
To be sure, Hayashi does not necessarily concede that consumers are, in fact,
present-biased. Hayashi adopts that view to illustrate why present-biased consumption may
still be rational.
214
Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 105, 111–12 (2013) (“[I]t is not at all clear that optimistic behavior reflects poor
financial choices . . . . [I]t seems far too simple to attribute misperception of product use to
a vague and general bias toward ‘optimism.’”).
215
Id.
216
Id. at 119–20.
217
Id. at 118.
218
See Allcott et al., supra note 171, at 3 (providing experimental evidence suggesting
that experienced payday borrowers may accurately predict their likelihood of future
borrowing).
212
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rewards: (1) $100 if the borrower did not borrow from any payday lender over the
next eight weeks, or (2) a certain cash payment for a lesser amount. The survey
results were largely consistent with Mann’s study: (1) “people almost fully
anticipate their likelihood of repeat borrowing,” and (2) experience matters, with
more experienced borrowers accurately predicting their likelihood of
reborrowing.219
The debate over consumer preferences is not just academic. Evidence of
consumer preferences would play a central role in the CFPB’s fight to regulate
payday loans.
3. The Survey Wars
Shortly after it was created in 2011, the CFPB began to explore federal
regulation of payday loans.220 After countless stakeholder meetings, white papers,
and a proposed rule that received over 1.4 million comments,221 the CFPB
promulgated the Payday Rule on November 17, 2017.222 The approach the CFPB
settled on in its Payday Rule mirrored the approach Skiba recommended in 2012:
permitting payday lending but setting restrictions on rollovers and renewals.223
The CFPB accomplished this in a somewhat indirect manner. The CFPB
created a general requirement that payday lenders must make a reasonable
determination that consumers “will have the ability-to-repay the loans according to
its terms.”224 The CFPB then provided a safe-harbor for what it called principal stepdown loans: loans of $500 or less that rolled over no more than twice with a declining
principal balance each time the loan is rolled over.225 As payday lenders generally
219

Id. at 2.
The CFPB held its first public field hearing on payday lending on January 19, 2012.
See Request for Comments: Hearing on Payday Lending, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,817 (Mar. 22,
2012).
221
See Payday Loan Protections, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/payday-rule/
[https://perma.cc/3SLE-RTLW]
(last
visited Sept. 12, 2021) (outlining a timeline of the CFPB’s rulemaking effort); Proposed
Rule: Payday, Vehicle Title and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, REGULATIONS,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0025-0001 [https://perma.cc/DN3
4-EUHY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (listing the 1,413,787 comments the CFPB received
for its proposed rule).
222
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54,472 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 54,874.
225
Id. at 54,876. The Payday Rule set several additional structural and underwriting
requirements on principal step-down loans, all of which were initially codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 1041.6. Structural requirements included that the loan must amortize pursuant to a fixed
amortization schedule; the lender cannot take a security interest in the consumer’s vehicle as
collateral for the loan; and the loan cannot be structured as open-end credit. Underwriting
requirements included that the consumer must not have had an outstanding covered loan in
220
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engage in minimal to no underwriting, the Payday Rule effectively banned loans
outside the safe harbor.
As an independent regulatory agency, the CFPB rulemaking is not subject to
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. But the CFPB is still
subject to some cost-benefit constraints. Section 1022 of Dodd-Frank provides that
the CFPB shall consider the following in exercising its rulemaking authority:
[T]he potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons,
including the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer
financial products or services resulting from such rule.226
The CFPB promulgated the Payday Rule under its general authority to prohibit
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”).227 The definition of
unfairness under the Consumer Financial Protection Act incorporates a cost-benefit
test. An act or practice is unfair if:
(A) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and
(B) such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.228
The statutory definition of abusiveness does not formally require that the CFPB
conduct a cost-benefit analysis229 but provides that the consumer’s understanding of
the transaction may be relevant. An act or practice is abusive if it:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of––
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;

the past 30 days; the loan cannot result in the consumer having a loan sequence of more than
three covered loans; and the loan cannot result in the consumer having during any
consecutive 12-month period: more than six covered short-term loans outstanding or covered
short-term loans outstanding for an aggregate period of more than 90 days. Finally, to meet
the Payday Rule’s safe harbor, a lender must not subsequently make a covered or noncovered loan to the consumer during the period the safe-harbored step-down loan is
outstanding and 30 days thereafter.
226
Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
227
See generally id. § 5531 (prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices
in connection with consumer financial transactions).
228
Id. § 5531(c)(1).
229
See Adam J. Levitin, “Abusive” Acts and Practices: Towards a Definition?, 2019
GEO. UNIV. L. CENT. 1, 20 (2019).
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(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer.230
Thus, in promulgating the Payday Rule, the CFPB had to engage with some of the
then-existing literature on present bias and optimism in payday lending. This
included the results of Mann’s 2012 survey.
Five years,231 854 pages in the Federal Register,232 and over a million comments
later,233 the fate of the Payday Rule would ultimately turn on two pages in the Federal
Register devoted to the Mann study.234 In its commentary to the final Payday Rule,
the CFPB pushed back on the conclusions Mann and others drew from the 2012
survey on a few grounds. First, the CFPB cited conflicting literature that suggested
payday borrowers did, in fact, suffer from present bias.235 Second, the CFPB
disputed Mann’s interpretation of his own survey data. In particular, the CFPB
argued that while the survey data provided some evidence that borrowers accurately
forecast their default risk, the data did not support a conclusion that borrowers with
long borrowing sequences accurately predicted this outcome.236 As the CFPB put it,
“a large share of borrowers who anticipated no reborrowing remain in debt for
multiple loans, and many are unable to even offer a guess as to the duration of their
indebtedness, let alone a precise prediction.”237 Because the Payday Rule favored
short sequences over long sequences, the CFPB concluded that Mann’s survey data
did not contradict the CFPB’s belief that borrowers did not understand the risks
associated with payday loans.238

230

12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
The CFPB’s first field hearing was in January 2012. See Request for Comments:
Hearing on Payday Lending, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,817 (Mar. 22, 2012). Its final rule was
promulgated in November 2017. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost
Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1041).
232
The CFPB’s proposed rule was 355 pages. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain
High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,864, 47,864–48,218 (July 22, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041). Its final rule was 449 pages. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and
Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. at 54,472–54,921.
233
See generally Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Payday, Vehicle, Title and Certain HighCost Installment Loans, REGULATIONS, https://www.regulations.gov/docket/CFPB-20160025 [https://perma.cc/J7SU-6ARJ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (indicating that the CFPB
received 1,413,787 comments to its proposed rule).
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Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. at
54,836–37.
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Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 54,837.
238
Id.
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A week after the CFPB promulgated its Payday Rule, the CFPB’s leadership
changed. Richard Cordray resigned239 and was first replaced by Mick Mulvaney240
and, eventually, Kathy Kraninger.241 Mulvaney and Kraninger made clear from the
outset that they intended to rescind the Payday Rule.242 The Kraninger CFPB began
this process in early 2019 and finalized its rescission of the underwriting requirement
of the Payday Rule on July 7, 2020.243
The analytic linchpin of the Kraninger CFPB’s rescission of the Payday Rule
was the Cordray CFPB’s purported failure to give adequate weight to Mann’s survey
data. In particular, the Kraninger CFPB argued that the Cordray CFPB cherry-picked
data from Mann’s study to support its argument that borrowers did not understand
the risks associated with payday loans.244 As the Kraninger CFPB explained: “[T]he
Mann study’s data overall indicates that payday borrowers in general—i.e.,
including consumers who engage in short sequences of payday loans—are able to
predict the length of their loan sequences with reasonable accuracy.”245 The new
CFPB concluded that the thin evidence the old CFPB relied on was insufficient to
fundamentally reshape the payday industry.246
Consumer advocates attempted to address the Kraninger CFPB’s concerns by
citing separate surveys from Nathalie Martin and others that found payday
consumers did not understand the APR or dollar cost of payday loans.247 The
Kraninger CFPB summarily dismissed these findings: “These studies do not ask the
direct and relevant question of whether consumers understand the magnitude and

239

Avie Schneider, Richard Cordray Stepping Down as Head of U.S. Consumer
Protection Agency, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/11/15/564349200/richard-cordray-stepping-down-as-head-of-u-s-consumerprotection-agency [https://perma.cc/TTM7-VAKG].
240
Statement on President Donald J. Trump’s Designation of OMB Director Mick
Mulvaney as Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statementpresident-donald-j-trumps-designation-omb-director-mick-mulvaney-acting-director-consu
mer-financial-protection-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/UFC4-EUXM].
241
Emily Sullivan, Senate Confirms Kathy Kraninger as CFPB Director, NPR (Dec.
6, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/06/673222706/senate-confirms-kathykraninger-as-cfpb-director [https://perma.cc/S62U-TSB2].
242
See CFPB Statement on Payday Rule, CFPB (JAN. 16, 2018), https://www.consumer
finance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-statement-payday-rule/
[https://perma.cc/W5C2PJDS]; Daniella Cheslow, Consumer Protection Bureau Aims to Roll Back Rule for Payday
Lending, NPR (Feb. 6, 2019, 2:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/06/691944789/consu
mer-protection-bureau-aims-to-roll-back-rules-for-payday-lending [https://perma.cc/8SZ6LT4Y].
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See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,382 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
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Id. at 44,401.
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likelihood of risk of harm associated with covered loans sufficient for them to
anticipate that harm and understand the need to take steps to avoid injury.”248
Though the focus of the Kraninger CFPB’s critique of the Payday Rule centered
on the Cordray CFPB’s failure to give adequate weight to the benefits payday
consumers derive from using their preferred form of credit, the Kraninger CFPB also
criticized the Cordray CFPB’s failure to consider the harm the Payday Rule might
cause. In particular, the Kraninger CFPB argued that the Payday Rule would
dramatically reduce the availability of payday loans to consumers who need
emergency funds to avoid potential harm.249
Are there lessons we can draw from the Payday Rule saga? On the one hand,
the effort to rescind the rule was deeply cynical and dispiriting (and perhaps
fraudulent). The Kraninger CFPB was motivated to find reasons to rescind the
Payday Rule, and the Mann study and other survey evidence provided a convenient
justification.250 The Kraninger CFPB simply ignored other survey data, and there
were reasons to think the Cordray CFPB was correct to view studies that were
favorable to payday lenders with some skepticism.251
On the other hand, the Payday Rule saga highlights the challenge of justifying
interventions in consumer financial markets on narrow grounds. Dodd-Frank placed
some soft limits on the CFPB’s rulemaking authority.252 The CFPB attempted to
navigate this terrain by highlighting imperfections in the market for payday loans.253
But the economics of the payday lending market are structured by conditions that
exist outside that market. By engaging on the issue of consumer preferences, the
CFPB was vulnerable to attacks such as the following one from Mann: “The problem
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See David Dayen, How to Buy a Regulation in Six Short Months, AM. PROSPECT
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2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/cfpb-payday-loans-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/J8HZ-PXDG].
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Research, FREAKONOMICS RADIO (Apr. 6, 2016, 11:00 PM), https://freakonomics.com/pod
cast/industry_ties_to_academic_research/ [https://perma.cc/C38C-PFBR] (detailing how the
firm that conducted the survey for Mann’s study was hired and paid for by a lawyer within
the payday lending industry).
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isn’t that payday loans are expensive, it’s that we live in a capitalistic society and
don’t have a safety net, and lots of people make less than other people and can’t
make ends meet.”254 That is not to suggest the Kraninger CFPB got the behavioral
psychology right but rather to suggest the limits of tying interventions to consumer
rationality.
C. Refund Anticipation Loans
Critiques that interventions are inefficient and regressive are not limited to the
regulation of private welfare substitutes but extend to the regulation of financial
products used to access the transfer system. Refund anticipation loans or RALs are
one such example. This section provides background on RALs and then explores a
critique of recent interventions in the RAL market.
1. Background
Clinton-era welfare reform consisted of two important changes to the safety
net. First, as described above, PRWORA eliminated AFDC and replaced it with
TANF, a much narrower program.255 Second, Congress significantly expanded
access to the EITC.256 The EITC is a refundable tax credit that is often described as
the “largest federal anti-poverty program.”257 However, the EITC is not strictly an
anti-poverty program. It is best understood as a work incentive for low-wage earners
with children.258 The EITC features a phase-in—where the credit increases as an
individual’s income increases—and then plateaus before phasing out.259 The
254

Kate Berry, One Study, Two Vastly Different Visions for CFPB Payday Rules, AM.
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Id. at 519.
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Indeed, proponents of EITC expansion explicitly advocated for it as “anti-welfare.”
See id. at 535 (noting that then President Bill Clinton emphasized the EITC “reward[s] work
over welfare”); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 539 (1995) (“Congressional proponents of
the [EITC] emphasized in 1993 that the EITC ‘is the furthest thing from a handout’ and ‘is
not welfare, by any means.’”).
259
See Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Low-End Regressivity, 72 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2018)
(arguing that the EITC and other refundable credits that “prioritize working families with
children create ‘low-end regressivity,’ in which certain poorer households face higher
average federal tax rates compared to better-off households”); Matt Bruenig, It’s Time for
Democrats to Abandon the Earned Income Tax Credit, JACOBIN (May 18, 2020),
https://jacobinmag.com/2020/05/iearned-income-tax-credit-eitc-poverty-welfare-benefits-
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somewhat regressive structure of the EITC is designed to incentivize low-wage
earners or TANF recipients to earn more with the carrot of a larger wage subsidy.260
Since its inception, the design and administration of the EITC have been
criticized. With respect to design, critics have argued that the EITC’s effectiveness
is largely undermined by the legal structure of U.S. markets.261 Labor markets are
structured in a way that disadvantages low-wage workers and single mothers—the
intended beneficiaries of the EITC.262 The U.S. also has a threadbare social safety
net and relies on markets to deliver “primary goods like health care, housing, [and]
child care.”263 Moreover, low-wage workers experience regular bouts of
unemployment.264 Because the EITC is only distributed once a year, the unemployed
and underemployed turn to high-cost loans to supplement their income.265 These
forces result in what Greene calls the bootstrap trap—welfare reform promotes and
requires self-sufficiency, but this self-sufficiency is undermined by costly private
substitutes for welfare.266
With respect to administration, the EITC is distributed through the tax code,
and qualification turns on complex questions about the definition of income and
families.267 The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) lacks the institutional capacity to
administer the EITC as public assistance.268 As a result, the administration of the
EITC largely falls to private tax preparers.269 However, there is a natural gap
between the publicly generated demand for low-income tax preparation services and
the cost of those services. Low-income wage earners need tax preparers to qualify
for the EITC but typically cannot afford to pay tax preparation fees.270 Consumer
finance fills this gap.
clinton [https://perma.cc/482G-PL9S] (describing the EITC’s regressive trapezoid
structure).
260
See Greene, Bootstrap, supra note 185, at 237; see also Alstott, supra note 258, at
541 (describing the EITC as “a ‘backwards’ income-transfer program, because it provides
greater dollar benefits to those with higher earnings and no benefits at all to those without
wages, regardless of need”).
261
See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 285, 287 (2010) (“[T]he EITC . . . cannot ‘make work pay,’ because it operates in a
legal context that creates deep disadvantage for low-wage workers and their children.”).
262
Id. at 297.
263
Id. at 304.
264
Id. at 300.
265
See Greene, Safety Net, supra note 256, at 523.
266
Greene, Bootstrap, supra note 185, at 240.
267
See Alstott, supra note 258, at 570.
268
See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 393, 434 (2008) (“The IRS has no system of local offices to help claimants apply, to
answer their questions about the [EITC’s] rules, or to examine verification of their
eligibility.”).
269
See Hayashi, supra note 8, at 722 (noting that “paid preparers are especially common
in areas with large numbers of EITC claimants”).
270
See Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Big Business, Big Bucks: Quickie Tax Loans
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The tax preparation industry created two financial products to meet the new
demand for low-income tax preparation: refund anticipation checks (“RACs”) and
refund anticipation loans (“RALs”). RACs allow consumers to defer the cost of tax
preparation by financing tax preparation with their refund.271 For RAC-issued tax
returns, the IRS sends the taxpayer’s refund to a temporary bank account set up by
the tax preparer.272 The tax preparer then disburses the funds to the consumer minus
any fees.273 Although RACs allow low-income consumers to obtain tax preparation
services without an immediate cash outlay, RACs make the costs of tax preparation
less salient.274
Less salient fees mean it is harder for tax preparers to compete on price. RALs
were designed to address this problem. RALs are short-term loans secured by a
consumer’s tax refund.275 RALs are offered before and during tax season toward the
end of the year276 and can be used as promotional devices tax preparers use to
compete for business.277 RALs and RACs are often bundled together.278 A consumer
who applies for a RAL with a tax preparer will likely have that same preparer file
the consumer’s return and finance the cost of return preparation with RAC.279
2. Intervention and Critique
From a consumer protection perspective, RALs and RACs present a few
potential problems. First, RALs are expensive.280 Second, the lack of price
transparency may create opportunities for tax preparers to inflate the cost of tax
preparation.281 Present-biased consumers may not be sensitive to these price
increases, which are bad both because they are extractive and because they misdirect

Generate Profits for Banks and Tax Preparers While Putting Low-Income Taxpayers at Risk,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 15–17 (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small
_loans/ral/2009-ral-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVJ2-WQD9].
271
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., 2020 TAX SEASON: MORE DELAYS AND HIGHER COSTS
FOR STRUGGLING TAXPAYERS 2 (Jan. 30, 2020) [hereinafter NCLC 2020 Report],
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/taxes/rpt-tax-time-jan2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82P7XUFW].
272
Id.
273
Refunds are typically dispersed by check, direct deposit, or a prepaid card. See id.
274
Cf. id. at 1–2.
275
See id. at 3.
276
See id.
277
Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, One Step Forward, One Step Back: Progress Seen in
Efforts Against High-Priced Refund Anticipation Loans, but Even More Abusive Products
Introduced, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 2 (2007), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost
_small_loans/ral/2007_ral_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2YV-WLUH] (describing the
emergence of holiday RALs and paystub RALs offered before tax season).
278
Cf. id. at 14–15.
279
Cf. id.
280
Id. at 10.
281
See NCLC 2020 Report, supra note 271, at 5–6.
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EITC funds to tax preparers.282 In the last ten years, there have been a number of
federal and state interventions to address these concerns.
The most important intervention was by the IRS. Like payday loans, RALs are
thinly underwritten.283 A preparer will generally offer a consumer a RAL if the
preparer can confirm that the borrower will likely receive a tax refund.284 Prior to
2010, this verification was provided by the IRS in the form of a federal debt
indicator.285 The debt indicator indicates if a taxpayer’s refund is subject to federal
offset for federal debt or certain other obligations.286 Yielding to pressure from
consumer advocates, the IRS stopped providing the federal indicator to tax preparers
in 2010.287 Federal banking regulators followed the IRS by putting pressure on banks
to stop financing RALs.288 And state lawmakers followed these regulatory moves
with state legislation setting interest caps on non-bank RALs and limiting the fees
preparers could charge for RALs and RACs.289
Were the welfare effects of these changes positive? Hayashi is dubious.
Building on his durable goods framework, Hayashi suggests that EITC benefits may
be undervalued without RALs.290 The EITC is, for better or worse, “the heart of the
public safety net.”291 As such, maximum consumption of the EITC is socially
optimal. Because we rely on financial intermediaries to deliver these benefits to
consumers, it is important to ensure that there are minimal barriers to this financial
intermediation. RALs are expensive, but the benefits of receiving and claiming the
EITC may be sufficient to overcome bounded rationality.
282

See Wu & Fox, supra note 270, at 12; Super, supra note 268, at 437 (noting that
“EITC claimants spend an estimated $1.75 billion per year out of their $30 billion credits to
purchase services”).
283
Chi Chi Wu, Corporate Welfare for the RAL Industry: The Debt Indicator, IRS
Subsidy, and Tax Fraud, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 5 (2005), https://www.nclc.org/images
/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ral/debt_indicator_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ8WJ82Q].
284
Id.
285
Id. at 2.
286
Id.
287
Chi Chi Wu & Jack Gillis, Consumer Advocates Applaud End of IRS-Provided
Service to Refund Anticipation Lenders, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. & CONSUMER FED’N AM.
(2010),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ral/pr-ral-irs-debtindicator-08-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/73BU-4PGX].
288
See Republic Bank & Trust Co., FDIC-10-079b (2011); OCC Bulletin 2010-7, Tax
Refund Anticipation Loans (Feb. 18, 2010), replaced by OCC 2015-36, Tax Refund-Related
Products: Risk Management Guidance (Aug. 4, 2015).
289
See Chi Chi Wu, Tom Feltner & Jean Ann Fox, Something Old, Something New in
Tax-Time Financial Products: Refund Anticipation Checks and the Next Wave of Quickie
Tax Loans, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. & CONSUMER FED’N AM. 28–31 (2013),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ral/ral-report-2013.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/E62X-YYCW] (summarizing state legislation and federal and state enforcement
actions against tax preparers).
290
Hayashi, supra note 8, at 719–20.
291
Greene, Safety Net, supra note 256, at 519.
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Hayashi tests whether the regulatory changes led to underconsumption of the
EITC and finds “that eliminating RALs is associated with reduced demand for tax
preparation services, decreased rates of EITC take-up, and substitution of RACs for
RALs.”292 Although Hayashi cannot distinguish between taxpayers who were
harmed by the elimination of RALs or made better off because of “some selfdefeating bias,” the “high degree of substitution from RALs to RACs” suggests most
of the consumers impacted by the changes were either credit-constrained or
extremely present-biased.293 The lesson Hayashi draws from his research is
“regulators should be wary about current efforts to curtail the market for RACs,
since this product provides one of the last financing options for taxpayers who need
tax assistance but are otherwise credit constrained and do not have cash on hand.”294
More fundamentally, consumer law scholarship that draws on “present bias”
research “is itself myopic” in neglecting to consider “what borrowed funds are used
for.”295
But there is a sense in which Hayashi’s own analysis reflects a different kind
of myopia in legal scholarship. And that is a blindness to the politics of
redistribution. Regulation of tax-related financial products was pursued for both
consumer protection and tax administration purposes. The EITC has a high error
rate, and there is some evidence that tax compliance problems with the EITC are
associated with tax preparer error.296 This issue is important because the EITC’s
error rate has been used as a cudgel by opponents of the welfare state to beat back
efforts to expand the EITC.297
A natural policy response to preparer error might be to directly regulate tax
preparers as opposed to limiting access to products that may be correlated with
preparer error. In fact, the IRS initially attempted to do this but was told it lacked
the statutory authority to regulate preparers.298 One way to understand RAL
regulation then is a second-best effort to get at the issue of tax compliance.

292

Hayashi, supra note 8, at 717.
Id. at 718.
294
Id. at 719.
295
Id. at 692.
296
See Super, supra note 268, at 438 (noting that returns prepared by local or informal
paid preparation services may be associated with high error rates); but see Leslie Book,
Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85, 98–104 (2009)
(explaining that while preparers may be responsible for noncompliance, the relationship
between the availability of RALs and noncompliance is less clear).
297
See Robert Rector & Jamie Bryan Hall, Reforming the Earned Income Tax Credit
and Additional Child Tax Credit to End Waste, Fraud, and Abuse and Strengthen Marriage,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/reforming-theearned-income-tax-credit-and-additional-child-tax-credit-end-waste [https://perma.cc/2M
MY-3JH5] (advocating narrowing the EITC to increase efficacy and limit fraud and false
payments).
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Understood this way, less redistribution may be justified if it increases tax
compliance and reduces pressure to pare back the EITC.299
None of this is to suggest that either Hayashi’s analysis of RALs or Mann’s
analysis of payday loans is misguided. Hayashi’s durable goods framework and
Mann’s survey results highlight the limits of justifying consumer financial
regulation within an efficiency framework. Bounded rationality may be good if it
prevents underconsumption of certain goods, and consumers may enter into
transactions fully aware of the attendant risks. Where I depart from Hayashi and
Mann is the view that consumer financial regulation should be tethered to efficiency
in the first place.
For Mann, the “best case against payday lending is that the market is plagued
by cognitive failures.”300 And Hayashi argues that “when consumers are acting
rationally, there should be a high bar for justifying the regulation of the substantive
terms of the product or service.”301 But it is unclear why either view is correct.
Hayashi fairly faults policymakers for ignoring “the broader economic and legal
system in which demand for the product arose [and] what demand for this product
tells us about the system.”302 But he stops short of suggesting policymakers
restructure the legal system to reshape demand. In the next Part, I suggest we make
that leap.
III. DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY AND REGULATORY DESIGN
The law shapes markets and the distribution of wealth and power within
markets. Within these constraints, market exchanges that appear superficially
irrational might be perfectly rational. Credit-constrained consumers may understand
the risks associated with high-cost, small-dollar credit and willingly enter these
transactions because there are no meaningful alternatives. And even if consumers
exhibit present bias, products that exploit present bias might be welfare-enhancing
if a temporal mismatch between the immediate costs and delayed benefits of certain
durable goods causes present-biased consumers to undervalue these goods.
Does consumer law have a role in restructuring the terms of rational exchanges?
One answer is no. Unless there is evidence of market failure, we should not
intervene.303 Alternatively, we can admit that the current cost and distribution of
resources in consumer financial markets is shaped by the law, and we can reallocate
this distribution by changing the law. The notion that the law is constitutive of
markets and matters for distribution is, of course, not new. This view was common

299

See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income
Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867 (2005) (defending the IRS’s increased emphasis on
compliance on the grounds that tax-type administration of the EITC is preferable to welfaretype administration).
300
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 98, at 884.
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Hayashi, supra note 8, at 752.
302
Id. at 754.
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See supra Section II.C.2.
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among legal realists during the Progressive Era.304 Recently, there has been an effort
to revive this older tradition along with older modes of regulation centered around
distribution that have fallen out of favor.305
It is this recent move towards what some call infrastructure regulation that I
draw on in this section. The emerging literature on infrastructure regulation
emphasizes public obligations—negative obligations to cease conduct or positive
obligations to provide services—as a core component of the broader infrastructure
toolkit.306 Consumer law should draw on this component of the infrastructure toolkit
to advance distributional goals in consumer financial markets. Here I consider three
such policy levers: rate and term restrictions, mandates, and transfers. Rate and term
restrictions are common in consumer financial regulation; mandates and transfers
are not.307 These are best understood as complementary tools. In this section, I
briefly sketch how we might use these tools together in consumer financial
regulation to pursue distributional ends.
Although I am drawing on older ideas, the specific policy levers examined here
reflect a common approach to redistribute income outside consumer financial
markets: cross-subsidies. Cross-subsidies generally exist when there is a pool of
consumers, and within that pool, some consumers pay higher in-pool costs to
subsidize lower in-pool costs for other consumers.308 Cross-subsidies exist in health
insurance regulation, family leave policy, patent law, and even class actions.309 In
some sense, the more modest aim of this Article is to encourage policymakers to
leverage cross-subsidies to address inequality in consumer financial markets in the
same manner we leverage cross-subsidies in other domains. This section outlines
how we can use rate and term restrictions, mandates, and transfers to cross-subsidize
cheaper services in consumer financial markets.
One note before proceeding. Although I argue that policymakers should center
distribution in evaluating and justifying interventions in consumer financial markets,
that does not mean I believe policymakers should ignore other justifications. For
example, we may want to intervene in consumer financial markets where the
distributional effects are unclear (or arguably regressive), but the intervention is
necessary on efficiency, moral, or other grounds. Moreover, an intervention might
be both efficient and have positive distributional effects.310 It seems strange to
suggest we ignore pro-efficiency arguments when they exist. And I do not mean to
rule out these and other grounds for intervention.
My primary goal in this article is to argue that distribution should play a more
central role in regulatory design. This is particularly important where interventions
are motivated by distributional concerns, and it may be very difficult to justify the
304
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307
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308
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intervention on efficiency grounds. As I argue in Parts I and II above, policymakers
should not view efficiency as a hard constraint on regulatory design and should feel
comfortable justifying interventions on purely distributional grounds.
A. Redistributive Rate and Term Restrictions
Rate and term restrictions are some of the oldest forms of consumer credit
regulation. Usury laws have an ancient pedigree,311 and restrictions on the terms of
loans date back to the early twentieth century.312 Both rate and term restrictions
continue to be used to regulate various consumer credit products.313 A natural
question then is whether this proposal reflects a departure from current practices.
My proposal is distinct from conventional approaches to rate and term restrictions
in two ways: it asks us to reconsider 1) how we justify imposing rate and term
restrictions and 2) how we use these restrictions.
Modern rate and term restrictions tend to be justified on two grounds. The first
is to correct market imperfections—the common justification for regulatory
interventions discussed and critiqued in Part II. Excessively high interest rates and
unorthodox terms may be prevalent in markets plagued by behavioral biases or
information asymmetries.314 Rate and term restrictions can overcome these biases
and asymmetries and transform costly and inefficient exchanges into efficient and
welfare-enhancing exchanges.315
A second justification is to prevent extraction.316 Lenders may have lopsided
bargaining power because of exogenous forces. Restrictions on rates or terms can
correct this imbalance and prevent lenders from exploiting borrowers’ weak
bargaining position. These two justifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
311
See Peterson, supra note 159, at 1113 (“Usury law, ‘the oldest continuous form of
commercial regulation,’ dates back to the earliest recorded civilizations, and continues to
constrain payday lending in many American states.”).
312
See FLEMING, supra note 162, at 61–77 (explaining the history of the Uniform Small
Loan Law).
313
For examples of modern rate and term restrictions, see 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2019) (the
Military Lending Act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-101 (2020) (state law regulating high-cost,
small-dollar loans); 15 U.S.C § 1639 (2019) (federal restrictions on high-cost mortgages);
and Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 22,844,
22,845 (Apr. 30, 2021) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (the Qualified Mortgage Rule).
Cf. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601).
314
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 11, at 26–46.
315
This is the essential argument made by proponents of payday regulation in supra
Section II.B.3. Setting restrictions on the size and terms of payday loans can combat
inefficiency because of imperfect information or behavioral bias. See also Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 11, at 98–100 (advocating ex-ante regulation of consumer credit markets
to correct for inefficiency as a result of information asymmetry and bounded rationality).
316
See Levitin, supra note 229, at 29–36 (defining “abusive” in terms of unjust
enrichment through “supracompetitive” pricing and “repeated efforts to extract funds” from
consumers).
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In fact, it is not unusual for scholars and regulators to justify interventions in
consumer financial markets on both grounds.317 The two justifications, however,
reflect different orientations toward market misconduct.
Market imperfection justifications are focused primarily on the consumer: the
consumer’s lack of financial sophistication, education, or income, and how these
factors may impair an otherwise rational exchange. For example, financial distress
may bias consumers towards expensive and financially detrimental exchanges. By
contrast, extractive justifications are focused on the lender: the lender’s knowledge,
the structure of the relevant market, and how these factors facilitate potentially
extractive exchanges. For example, if consumers are price-insensitive and demand
is inelastic, lenders may be able to charge supracompetitive prices.318 These
exchanges may be rational, but intervention might be warranted to prevent lenders
from exploiting consumers.
We can trace extractive justifications to Progressive-era concerns about the
distribution of bargaining power in markets. Realists such as Karl Llewelyn and
Friedrich Kessler were concerned that adhesion contracts facilitated extractive
exchanges by parties with superior bargaining power.319 Similarly, Robert Hale
believed that all market exchanges were structured by coercion.320 In Hale’s famous
formulation, both buyers and sellers exert coercive pressure in market exchanges,
but “[t]he amount of pressure which each can exert is very unevenly distributed,
with the result that some are economically strong, others economically weak.”321 For
Llewelyn, the solution was legal standards such as unconscionability to balance
uneven exchanges.322 Hale, however, pushed for more than just balanced exchanges.

317
See Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending
Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. 1257 (2020) [hereinafter Levitin, Auto] (arguing that interventions in
auto lending markets are necessary to prevent extraction but also suggesting there may be
behavioral grounds that justify intervention); Levitin, supra note 229, at 31–32 (explaining
that a practice may be abusive because of unjust enrichment or because a consumer lacks
understanding, and noting that the CFPB cited both grounds in promulgating its Payday
Rule).
318
See Levitin, Auto, supra note 317, at 1289–96.
319
See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704 (1931); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
320
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (presenting a coercion framework). Hale’s framework may seem
extreme in certain contexts, but it is quite clear both critics and proponents of consumer credit
regulation understand consumer credit markets as structured by coercion.
321
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER 131 (1952); see also William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the
Long History of Economic Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. REG. 721, 760 (2018)
(describing Hale’s views on coercion).
322
See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1402–05 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Unconscionability].
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For Hale, legal rules such as rate restrictions could be used to redistribute what he
termed “unearned [producer] surplus or rent” from those with more power to those
with less.323
Modern unconscionability doctrine and loan restrictions are largely
disconnected from Realist era conceptions.324 But there is some evidence of a shift
away from consumer preferences and towards lender knowledge and market
structure.325 My push for rate and term restrictions draws on this history and recent
shift in two ways. First, we should pursue interventions where resources in consumer
financial markets appear unequally distributed. And second, we should design rate
and term restrictions to address this unequal distribution.
Although my push for redistributive rate and term restrictions draws on Realist
era concepts, it departs in important ways. Drawing on marginalist theory, Hale
sought to intervene in markets where market conditions facilitated extraction in the
323

See Boyd, supra note 321, at 760.
Although extraction is relevant in modern unconscionability doctrine, the
consumer’s experience in the bargaining process remains central to the analysis. See Jacob
Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS 965, 988
(2019) (noting that in analyzing procedural unconscionability, “the court is supposed to focus
on the consumer’s bargaining process, and whether the consumer experienced ‘unfair
surprise’ or the absence of ‘meaningful choice’”). The same is largely true for the federal
and state loan restrictions, as demonstrated by the debate over the Payday Rule discussed
infra Section III.B. The tension between extraction and consumer preference existed at the
time the Uniform Commercial Code was initially drafted and in the earliest decisions on
unconscionability. See Fleming, Unconscionability, supra note 322324, at 1402–05. As
Anne Fleming explains, Judge Skelly Wright’s initial draft of the famous Williams v. WalkerThomas decision focused the fact on that Walker-Thomas Furniture “knew, or obviously
should have known, that, because of the purchaser’s circumstances, a default in monthly
payments and, hence, repossession of all items purchased in the past three years would
almost inevitably ensue.” Id. at 1417. Skelly Wright ultimately abandoned this reasoning in
the actual decision focusing instead on the fact that Williams and Thorne appeared
“intellectually deficient, helpless, and in need of protection.” Id.
325
We can see signs of this shift in doctrine and scholarship. Several recent cases
suggest that some courts may be open to unconscionability and unfairness claims based on
structural arguments as opposed to consumer preference. See De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc.,
422 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Cal. 2018) (holding that under California law, an interest rate can be
so high that it renders the loan unconscionable); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs. Inc., 219 F. Supp.
3d 878, 913, 918–21 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (holding for-profit school’s practices were abusive and
unfair where the school steered students into loans with a known default rate in excess of 60
percent); Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Mass. 2008)
(holding mortgage lender’s practices were unfair where lender extended credit on terms the
lender knew or should have known meant that the loans were “doomed to foreclosure”). In
addition, some scholars have recently argued for interventions in consumer financial markets
to address extractive pricing. See generally Levitin, Auto, supra note 317; Van Loo, supra
note 8; see generally Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 431
(2021) (tracing the evolution of federal unfairness from an expansive doctrine to a narrow
doctrine focused on consumer preference and arguing for a return to a more expansive
conception of unfairness).
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form of producer surplus and to redistribute this producer surplus. As this Article is
a broad attack on efficiency frameworks, I am less sanguine about tying
interventions to extraction and surplus. Instead, I draw on these concepts in a softer
way. I believe we should intervene to address unequal distribution, even if it is
difficult to demonstrate extraction (e.g., a captured market and supracompetitive
pricing) and the opportunity to redistribute surplus. Put simply, we should feel
comfortable intervening in markets if the loans cost too much.
Even a soft neo-Haleian move towards redistributive regulation must address
the problems Hale and others faced in attempting to redistribute producer surplus 80
years ago. The first issue Hale and others confronted was where to set rate
restrictions.326 Rates had to be set at a level sufficient to redistribute producer surplus
but encourage production and prevent fungible capital from exiting heavily
regulated markets.327 The second issue was the incidence of rate restrictions. It was
unclear who bore the costs of rate restrictions and if, on balance, redistributed
producer surplus was ultimately a progressive intervention or a regressive one.328
As Barbara Fried notes, Ramseyian taxes suffered from similar problems.329
Ramseyian taxes are like Haleian rate restrictions except focused on redistributing
consumer surplus as opposed to producer surplus.330 Because Ramseyian taxes work
best where demand is inelastic, the case for Ramseyian taxes is strongest for
necessities as opposed to luxuries.331 As discussed in Part II, the regressive
implications of Ramseyian taxes led scholars to abandon Ramseyian taxes (and
Haleian rate restrictions) in favor of redistribution through tax-and-transfer.332
There are a few reasons to think a neo-Haleian or neo-Ramesyian move in
consumer financial regulation might avoid these problems. First, consumer financial
markets are already regressive. In certain consumer financial markets, low-income
consumers finance, through higher prices, cheaper services for rich consumers.
Natasha Sarin provides some examples of these regressive cross-subsidies. One is
overdraft markets. Banks offer free or low-cost checking accounts, pricing these
services below cost.333 Banks can afford this, as Sarin explains, “because fee income
generated primarily from low-income consumers, such as overdraft revenue, helped
cover the cost of providing these services.”334
Another example is interchange fees in conventional retail transactions. Credit
card companies charge merchants interchange fees, which are passed onto
consumers in the form of higher retail prices for goods. Low-income consumers who
pay with either cash or debit cards generally absorb these costs. By contrast, wealthy
326
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consumers with credit cards and rewards plans often receive cashback, which
minimizes the interchange distortion. Indeed, as Sarin explains, “[o]n average, cardusing households receive over $1,100 from cash users every year. Rewards are
subsidized by higher retail prices for low-income consumers.”335 In both cases, these
consumers may be perfectly rational, but rate and term restrictions can help unwind
these regressive cross-subsidies.336
Second, flexible standards can minimize some of the distortions and reduce
some of the complexity associated with setting rate and term restrictions.337 Rate and
term restrictions may be overinclusive and capture consumers who can afford more
expensive loans.338 Lenders may shift the costs of this lost expected revenue by
increasing fees for other services. Although cross-subsidies contemplate costshifting, too much cross-shifting, as discussed below, can cause the cross-subsidy to
unravel.
Conversely, rate and term restrictions might be underinclusive and allow
lenders to saddle some consumers with loans that are likely to fail. In addition, it is
relatively easy for lenders to structure loans to avoid rate and term restrictions.339 To
avoid these issues, policymakers are increasingly turning to ability-to-repay
standards—requirements that a lender evaluate a borrower’s ability to repay the
loan—in consumer financial regulation.340 Ability-to-repay standards exist in
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mortgage regulation,341 credit card regulation,342 and the recently rescinded Payday
Rule.343 Adopting a flexible standard over a static restriction might minimize some
of the problems associated with redistributive rate and term restrictions.
B. Mandates and Transfers
There are a few limits to pursuing rate and term restrictions in isolation. First,
poor consumers may rely on financial services outside conventional banking
arrangements. For these unbanked and underbanked consumers, it might be difficult
to cross-subsidize cheaper services. Second, rate restrictions pursued in isolation can
cause the implicit cross-subsidy to unravel. Cross-subsidies “by their nature
typically operate only within pools.”344 Financial institutions can respond to a rate
or term regulation by dropping the product or raising fees on wealthier consumers
to offset reduced revenue from the rate cap.345 If financial institutions drop the
product, low-income consumers may have to turn to costlier alternatives.346 If
financial institutions raise fees on wealthier consumers too much, these consumers
may leave the pool, causing prices to spike. This can cause the pool to unravel as
financial institutions have to raise fees to account for a smaller pool, which leads to
more departures.
The common way to tackle these problems in the regulation of other markets is
to expand the pool through mandates and transfers. By mandates, I am referring to
what Morgan Ricks calls “universal service requirements,”347 or Sabeel Rahman
describes as “positive obligations to proactively provide equal, affordable, and
accessible services to under-served constituencies.”348 These are common devices in
the regulation of other markets. Increasingly, there is a recognition that mandates
belong in financial markets. Financial institutions distribute public funds and
essential services and presently allocate these services in a way that exacerbates
economic inequality.349 Consumer financial markets are broadly regressive, with
expensive products for the poor and cheaper products for the rich.350 Mandates may

341

12 C.F.R. § 1026.43 (2021).
Id. § 1026.51.
343
Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.
54,472 (Nov. 17, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041).
344
Brooks et al., supra note 34, at 1274.
345
But see Sarin, supra note 333, at 1578–81 (questioning whether banks will pass the
costs of regulation on to consumers).
346
But see Littwin, supra note 147.
347
Ricks, supra note 32, at 768.
348
Rahman, supra note 32, at 1626. In this sense, the mandates I call for are distinct
from soft mandates to provide credit without specific terms that have been criticized as
misguided and ineffective. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
887, 887–88 (2019) [hereinafter Baradaran, Jim Crow].
349
White, supra note 32, at 1268–74.
350
Baradaran, Jim Crow, supra note 348, at 907–16.
342

2022]

CONSUMER LAW’S EQUITY GAP

565

be a way to create larger cross-subsidies to address pervasive regressivity in
financial markets.
As an illustration, consider the overdraft example from above. We could use
rate and term restrictions to drive down the cost of overdraft and use mandates to
ensure that overdraft consumers get access to revolving or other credit on equal
terms. These regulations would likely drive up the cost of credit for wealthier
consumers, and financial institutions could use those costs to cross-subsidize
cheaper services for poor consumers. But rate and term restrictions and mandates
are likely insufficient. Financial institutions still may argue they cannot offer
services to poor consumers at or below cost without significant fees on rich
consumers.351 And even under a rigorous ability-to-repay standard, loans will
continue to be unaffordable for some consumers. Transfers may be able to address
both issues of cost and affordability.
We can think of two kinds of transfers: ex ante and ex post. Ex ante subsidies
could reduce the burden of providing loans below marginal cost.352 Ex ante subsidies
could also address the issue of unaffordability. If a consumer cannot afford monthly
payments on a loan because of insufficient income, then an indirect subsidy could
help bridge that gap. But subsidies present a host of other problems and are likely a
weak tool to address unaffordability. It may be hard to determine how to target these
subsidies. Subsidies may also encourage undesirable consumption.353 And subsidies
do not address the problem of consumers who fall behind after entering into a loan.
Some measure of subsidies may be inevitable, but the better way to handle
unaffordability is with ex post debt relief.354 Relieving existing private debt outside
bankruptcy is likely not viable outside some adversarial process. As I have argued
elsewhere, a more capacious understanding of UDAAP authority might result in
enforcement actions that could restructure costly private debt.355 But in the absence
of these actions, there are likely few avenues to modify existing private debt. The
story with new debt is quite different. We can explicitly build in debt relief for new
loans in several ways. For example, payments could be scaled to a consumer’s
income, and the debt could be forgiven after a certain period. We could also
empower a regulator to periodically forgive debt as a macroeconomic lever or as a
sanction for lender misconduct.
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The above is just a brief sketch of ways we might try to address the unequal
distribution of resources in consumer financial markets. Together, these tools can
address demand-side issues in consumer financial regulation and may make it easier
to intervene in consumer financial markets on more expansive grounds.
C. Revisiting Student Loans
I began this Article with the example of student loans and then spent the bulk
of it discussing fringe financial products. Let me briefly defend that choice.
The approaches outlined above are all features of the regulatory landscape in
student lending. Student loan regulation includes loan restrictions, universal access,
and transfers.356 Some have suggested that the way to fix the student debt crisis is
by making the cross-subsidies in student lending more transparent and
progressive.357 There is a lack of parity between the way we structure and regulate
student loans and fringe financial markets. Using a broader policy toolkit that
includes distributional levers can address financial market inequity and harmonize
our approach to regulation across different lending sectors.
One obvious objection to the comparison is that student loans are
fundamentally different from fringe financial products. The student loan market is
shaped and controlled by the federal government, which makes it both easier to use
an expansive set of tools and to defend that choice. But it is important to remember
that the federal structure of higher education financing was not always explicit or
well-understood.
The late twentieth-century shift in higher-education policy from low tuition and
direct subsidies to high tuition and indirect subsidies obscured the public nature of
higher education financing.358 And this colored the way the scholars and
policymakers approached problems in higher education financing.359 Recovering the
way higher education financing is a species of public law was an active project.
Scholars worked to reshape our understanding of how federal policy shapes higher
education financing, and how we can change this policy.360
There is an emerging shift in legal scholarship away from conceptualizing
markets as private and self-correcting to publicly constructed and actively governed.
356
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You can see traces of this shift in antitrust, consumer protection, energy law, and
banking.361 Although this article does not offer a thick account of how fringe
financial markets are publicly constructed and governed,362 it highlights how the law
shapes supply and demand in this market. As discussed below, the policy
implications of surfacing these issues are contested and a bit unclear. But my hope
is that a pivot towards distribution can help us engage with the ways the law shapes
supply and demand in consumer financial markets as opposed to merely viewing
consumer law as a gap-filling layer on top of private law.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF SOCIAL PROVISION PLURALISM
This Article focuses on the primary argument in the legal literature against
redistribution outside tax-and-transfer. In this Part, I consider a different objection
to redistribution through the financial system: path dependency.363 A central puzzle
in comparative political economy is why there is more poverty in America than in
other advanced industrial nations.364 One answer is that America features a minimal
state with a largely unregulated market.365 In her history of twentieth-century
American political economy, Prasad contends that this popular account has it
squarely backward.366
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America does not feature a minimal state but a highly interventionist one with
extensive taxation and regulation.367 Per Prasad, the modern regulatory state
emerged as a result of a series of interventions in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century.368 These interventions were the product of tension between
America’s productive capacity and extensive poverty and a unique agrarian political
economy.369 Agrarian populists pushed for the breakup of concentrated capital and
subsidization of consumption, which culminated in antimonopoly legislation, the
progressive income tax, decentralization of finance, and extensive federal
interventions in financial markets.370
American interventions were different than European interventions, which
featured regressive consumption taxes and social welfare.371 Prasad argues that this
difference helps explain the neoliberal turn in the 1970s and 1980s.372 Progressive
income taxes and extensive regulation gave rise to a deregulatory backlash during
the economic crisis of the 1970s.373 Financial deregulation and the liberalization of
credit were the products of this neoliberal backlash.374 As a result, today, we rely on
private credit to provide social provision, and this arrangement has proved much less
effective at fighting poverty than European social welfare.375
Prasad does not suggest that market regulation was deliberately pursued to
undermine the development of a robust welfare state. Anne Fleming, however,
suggests there is some evidence that regulation was pursued to prevent the expansion
of the welfare state.376 In particular, Fleming explains that a key argument of early
consumer advocates was that consumer credit regulation would “prevent pauperism
and thereby reduce spending on public welfare.”377 Fleming suggests there is a
throughline between early twentieth-century “anti-pauperist” arguments and present
calls for greater consumer financial regulation.378
If Prasad and Fleming are correct and there is a trade-off between credit and
public welfare, is that necessarily a bad thing? Abbye Atkinson suggests we should
have serious concerns about credit as our exclusive form of social provision.379
Atkinson identifies two important problems with credit as social provision. The first
367
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is that credit is an intertemporal transfer of wealth, shifting “an individual’s future
capital to facilitate present consumption.”380 If there is no interperiod redistribution,
credit can only work as a social provision if the borrower’s economic standing
improves between when the debt is incurred and must be repaid.381 And there is little
evidence that private credit facilitates this economic transformation. The second
issue is that credit that cannot be repaid becomes debt, which has often functioned
as a mechanism to subordinate socioeconomically marginalized groups.382 And
Pamela Foohey raises a third and important issue: credit may encourage undesirable
consumption.383
There are a few reasons to doubt the strongest version of the path dependency
argument. First, it is not entirely clear that there is a trade-off between social
provision through the financial system and traditional social welfare.384 Prasad
herself makes clear that the events that led to the development of the modern
American financial system were the product of multiple factors.385 New Deal era
interventions did not necessarily preclude other interventions. And it is not obvious
that pursuing more redistributive policies in consumer law will “crowd out” other
forms of redistribution.
Second, whether credit functions as social provision turns less on the mechanics
of credit as an abstract notion and more on the concrete set of legal obligations tied
to the credit relationship. In fact, much of the modern criticism of private credit is
tied to deregulatory moves that made both the costs of credit and the damage of debt
more severe at a time when credit markets opened to historically marginalized
groups.386 That is not to suggest that repairing the New Deal architecture is
sufficient. Credit absolutely cannot function as our only form of social provision.
But credit markets can function better than they presently do.387
Finally, it is not clear that ignoring distributional issues in consumer law will
necessarily yield good outcomes. There is very little evidence that a lack of
redistribution in law results in more redistribution through tax-and-transfer.388
Moreover, there are good reasons to think that private credit may remain a problem
380
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even with robust social welfare.389 Thus, we should not expect that the availability
of social welfare or public options will eliminate or necessarily diminish demand for
potentially exploitative private credit. If that is true, it is unclear what pursuing a
suboptimal policy in consumer law achieves.
WHY NOT CONSUMER LAW?
What I have attempted to show in this Article is that background legal
conditions shape demand in consumer markets in a way that makes it difficult to
regulate markets without the tools to change those background conditions. But
considering the events of the last few years, is there anyone who really doubts that
is true? The simple answer is yes. As the student debt relief debate highlights, there
are plenty of people who object to redistribution outside tax-and-transfer on the
grounds that it is inefficient, regressive, and will crowd out other forms of
redistribution. But even if that were not the case, there is still the issue of how to
allocate redistributive authority.
The distributive levers that I explore in this Article are not new. Many other
scholars have explored similar themes. Yet few have suggested that this
redistributive authority should be located within consumer law or with a consumer
regulator. I have been somewhat vague about what redistributive consumer law
might look like in practice. I will end by briefly sketching out one possible future.
One way to understand my push for more redistribution in consumer law is an
attempt to deliver on the promise of reform in 2007. Scholars and policymakers
advocated for a new federal regulator for several reasons. One reason was that
existing authority over consumer financial regulation was fragmented and
inconsistently applied.390 But a second and equally important reason was that
prudential regulators largely believed their primary mandate was to protect financial
institutions.391 And during the Trump Administration, regulators reclaimed their
mantle as the guardians of finance.392
389
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Finance affects the lives of millions of ordinary Americans. Consumer
advocates wanted consumers to have a seat at the table. They got their desired
agency, but there were important limits. The CFPB has some prudential-like powers:
it can supervise and examine financial institutions. But the CFPB lacks the tools to
coordinate economic activity.393
The CFPB cannot directly restrict rates, and its general unfairness authority is
subject to a cost-benefit standard. Moreover, the CFPB likely lacks the authority to
use all the distributional levers discussed in this Article. The CFPB likely has the
power to redistribute some income pursuant to its general UDAAP authority. But
the CFPB presently lacks the ability to broadly implement this Article’s
prescriptions.
One simple implication of this Article then is that we should reconsider the
compromise struck in Dodd-Frank and grant the CFPB broader authority to
coordinate economic activity. For some, this may seem misguided. Many scholars
recognize that Dodd-Frank was an incomplete solution to the problems that ailed
consumer financial markets. For these scholars, the solutions generally lie outside
consumer law.394 While I am broadly sympathetic to these reform efforts, I believe
consumer law can play a role in the broader effort to democratize finance.
There are other good reasons why it may not be wise to pursue legislation that
expands the CFPB’s authority. Such an effort would inevitably lead to a discussion
about its overall structure. But that fight might be worth engaging in if it resulted in
the CFPB having tools to regulate not only the supply of credit but also the demand
for credit.395
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